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INTRODUCTION
Today, there are over eighteen million refugees scattered around
the globe.' They huddle in camps in nearly all parts of the world,
including Europe, Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Americas.2
Many fled their homelands because of war, famine, or for economic
reasons.3 Others fled because of persecution or fear of persecution
on account of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership within a particular social group and currently seek
political asylum.4
1. See U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY-1991 IN REVIEW 33 n.9 tbl.
1 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY] (reporting existence of 18 million refu-
gees counted in most recent global survey and noting that number of refugees has steadily
increased since mid-1980s). For example, in 1986 there were an estimated 11,698,000 refu-
gees worldwide. U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY-1986 IN REVIEW 37
tbl. 1 (1987) [hereinafter 1986 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY]. In 1987, the number grew to
13,296,460. U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY-1987 IN REVIEW 31 tbl. 1
(1988) [hereinafter 1987 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY]. And in 1988, the number of refugees was
estimated to be 14,421,800. U.S. COMM. FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY-1988 IN
REVIEW 33 tbl. 1 (1989) [hereinafter 1988 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY].
2. See 1991 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 32-33 tbl. 1 (noting that Africa
contains over 5,000,000 refugees; East Asia and the Pacific 592,100; Europe and North
America 737,600; Latin America and the Caribbean 118,950; and the Middle East and South
Asia 9,797,200).
3. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, INHUMANE DETERRENCE: THE TREAT-
MENT OF VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE IN HONG KONG 1 (1989) [hereinafter INHUMANE DETER-
RENCE] (commenting that since 1975, two million Vietnamese, Laotians, and Cambodians fled
their homelands due to repressive governments and brutal wars).
4. See Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. I(A)(2), 189
U.N.T.S. 137, 152 [hereinafter 1951 Convention], as amended by Protocol Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees,Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1(2), 19 U.S.T. 6223, 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, 268 [herein-
after 1967 Protocol]. The 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol define the term "refugee"
as any person who,
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This Comment focuses on whether the forced repatriation 5 of cer-
tain individuals or subgroups of Vietnamese asylum seekers violates
international law. 6 At issue are individuals and subgroups within
the larger group of asylum seekers in Hong Kong "first asylum"
camps 7 who are "screened out"8 as "economic migrants"9 and face
forcible repatriation to Vietnam. Part I provides a brief history of
the flight of Vietnamese asylum seekers and their current situation
in Hong Kong and other countries in Southeast Asia. Part 11 dis-
cusses the principle of "non-refoulement"'10 as it relates to the forced
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nation-
ality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his or her nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail him or herself of the protection of that country, or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his or her former habitual residence as a result of
such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
Id.
5. See Jim Mann, U.S. Eases Stance on Repatriating Indochinese "Boat People," L.A. TIMES,
July 28, 1990, at A14 (explaining that forced repatriation refers to forcibly returning people
to their country of nationality).
6. See 1951 Convention, supra note 4, art. 33, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176, as amended by 1967
Protocol, supra note 4, 19 U.S.T. at 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. at 270 (defining obligation of states to
protect rights of refugees under inter,,ational law). The most important articles contained in
these documents are those relating to "refoulement," or the involuntary repatriation of refu-
gees. Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention states that "[n]o contracting state shall expel or
return ("refouler") a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where
his [or her] life or freedom would be threatened." 1951 Convention, supra note 4, art. 33(1),
189 U.N.T.S. at 156. The doctrine of non-refoulement does not prohibit a state from expelling a
refugee from its territory, but it forbids a state from refouling or returning a refugee to any
country or territory where the refugee's life or freedom would be endangered. See GUNNELL
STENBERG, NoN-ExPULSION AND NON-REFOULEMENT 71 (1989) (stating that to comply with
principle of non-refoulement, refugee must not be sent to country where he or she is at risk of
political persecution).
7. See INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 8 (defining country of "first asylum" as
country where refugees first arrive seeking temporary asylum); see also Indefinite Detention and
Mandatory Repatriation: The Incarceration of Vietnamese in Hong Kong, ASIA WATCH, Dec. 3, 1991, at
3 [hereinafter Indefinite Detention] (establishing that at 1979 Geneva Conference, countries of
Southeast Asia agreed to extend temporary asylum to those who fled Vietnam).
8. See OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS, para. 189, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng. Rev.
1 (1988) [hereinafter U.N. HANDBOOK] (explaining that no specific regulations for determina-
tion of refugee status under 1951 Convention exist, and as a result, each contracting state is
left to implement any screening procedures it feels appropriate in light of state's particular
constitutional and administrative structure); Daniel Wolf, The Boat People Stilt Deserve Our Help;
Hong Kong's "Screening" of Vietnamese Refugees Is a Farce, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 1989, at A23
(defining "screening" as process by which status of asylum seeker is determined).
9. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 62 (defining "economic migrant" as person
who does not meet definitional requirements of term "refugee" but who voluntarily leaves his
or her native country under exclusive influence of economic considerations to establish resi-
dence elsewhere); see also Guy S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW I
(1983) (noting that economic refugees do not enjoy benefits of protection and assistance pro-
vided by international asylum laws because solutions to their problems are related to eco-
nomic aid and development rather than to institution of asylum).
10. See Abigail D. King, Note, Interdiction: The United States' Continuing Violation of Interna-
tional Law, 68 B.U. L. REV. 773, 774 n.5 (1988) (noting that term "non-refou'ment" is derived
from French word "refouler," meaning to return, reconduct, or send back, and in context of
refugee law, "refouler" refers to international prohibition against returning refugees to any
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repatriation of Vietnamese asylum seekers. Part III explores the
possibility of classifying certain individual or groups of asylum seek-
ers as "refugees sur place" 11 and presents shortcomings inherent in
the efforts to monitor the safety of forced and voluntary returnees to
Vietnam. Part IV examines problems inherent in the recognition of
sur place refugee status. Part V recommends that the United Nations
expand the use of its mandate power to recognize asylum seekers as
refugees until Hong Kong fully considers sur place refugee claims,
thus ensuring that the principle of non-refoulement is not violated.
This Comment concludes by urging that the international commu-
nity, through the United Nations, renew its commitment to the prin-
ciple that all persons who risk persecution based on their race,
religion, nationality, membership in a social group, or political opin-
ion, are provided a safe haven.
I. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF FLIGHT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS FROM
VIETNAM
Since 1975, social and political upheavals have caused approxi-
mately two million Southeast Asians to cross international bounda-
ries seeking asylum.12 Over one million persons have left Vietnam
alone.13 Many of these people, mainly of Vietnamese, Cambodian,
and Laotian origin, are recognized as refugees under international
law. 14 More than one million refugees have been resettled by inter-
national aid agencies in the United States,' 5 while thousands of
others now live in France, Canada, and Australia. t 6 Thousands of
territory where they are likely to become victims of persecution); see also GoODWIN-GILL, supra
note 9, at 69 (stating that in context of immigration law, "refoulement" is term of art meaning
"summary reconductation to the frontier of those discovered to have entered illegally and
summary refusal of admission of those without valid papers"). The principle of non-refoulement
is not an absolute principle; indeed, factors such as national security and public order have
long been recognized as exceptions to the principle. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 9, at 95.
11. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 94 (defining "refugee sur place" as "[a] person
who was not a refugee when he [or she] left his [or her] country, but who becomes a refugee
at a later date").
12. INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 1.
13. 1987 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 51.
14. See INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 1-2 (observing that when Vietnamese
citizens first began to flee to other Southeast Asian nations, they were treated with compas-
sion and granted asylum, but as more persons emigrated, that compassion changed to abuse
and emigres were no longer automatically considered "refugees").
15. See Jewel S. Lafontant, Crafting a U.S. Refugee Policy for Asia and the World, HERrrAGE
FOUND. REP., No. 239 (1990), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (noting that United
States, by resettling over one million Southeast Asian refugees within its borders since 1975,
has resettled more refugees from that region of world than rest of world combined); see also id.
(stating that in 1990, United States was world's largest donor of money to international refu-
gee aid agencies).
16. See 1991 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 36 tbl. 9 (indicating that United
States, with 1,355,856 refugees resettled, Canada, with 287,225 resettled, France, with
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needy Southeast Asians, however, continue to flee their homelands
each month, while hundreds of thousands more remain in the nu-
merous detention centers dotting Southeast Asia.' 7
The longevity of this Southeast Asian crisis has caused despair
among "resettlement countries," 18 including the United States,
Canada, Australia, and France.1 9 The quandary is also deeply
troubling for countries of "first asylum," which in Southeast Asia
include Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Hong
Kong.20 Western resettlement nations have become "compassion
fatigued" 2 1 as refugee flows that began almost two decades ago con-
tinue with little hope for a permanent solution in the foreseeable
future.22 Furthermore, the historic solution, resettlement, is in-
creasingly less viable because refugee migrations in Eastern Europe
and other parts of the world,23 combined with a recently relaxed
emigration policy in the former Soviet Union,24 make competition
for entry into the United States and other resettlement countries
186,957, and Australia, with 172,823 refugees resettled, are world's largest recipients of
Southeast Asian refugees for permanent resettlement).
17. See 1991 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 33 tbl. 1 (reporting that number
and nationality of refugees in detention centers in Southeast Asia are as follows: Hong Kong,
52,000 Vietnamese; Indonesia, 18,700 Vietnamese and 1800 Cambodians; Malaysia, 14,600
Vietnamese; the Philippines, 19,600 Vietnamese; Thailand, 326,000 Cambodians, 67,400
Laotians, 45,000 Burmese, and 15,000 Vietnamese; and Vietnam, 16,700 Cambodians),
18. See INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that term "resettlement coun-
tries" generally refers to Western nations that have accepted refugees for permanent
resettlement).
19. 1991 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 36 tbl. 9.
20. See Mann, supra note 5, at A14 (commenting that more than 110,000 Indochinese are
in refugee camps in listed countries).
21. See Barry James, CARE Chief Assails Nations' 'Meaner' View of Aid, INTr'L HERALD TRm.
(Paris), Oct. 7, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (describing "compassion
fatigue" as phenomenon that manifests itself in decline in foreign aid for asylum seekers);
Takashi Oka, The Ability to Feel, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 10, 1991, at 18 (noting that
compassion fatigue sets in when problems become too large for person to comprehend or
resolve); Jon Swain, Voyage of Fearfor Boat People, SUNDAY TIMES (London), June 17, 1990, § 1,
at 26 (describing existence of global compassion fatigue regarding situation of Vietnamese
asylum seekers).
22. See Court Robinson, Sins of Omission: The New Vietnamese Refugee Crisiv, in 1988 WORLD
REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 5, 11 (noting that long-term solutions might include reset-
tlement of refugees via use of nonrefugee categories, local settlement on limited basis, and
safe repatriation to refugees' native countries).
23. See Kalman Kulcsar, The Refugee Problem and Hungary, in 1991 WORiD REFUGEE SUR-
VEY, supra note 1, at 72-74 (discussing refugee flows in Romania and Hungary and acknowl-
edging possibility of millions of refugees coming to West as result of events occurring in
former Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries).
24. See 1988 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 83 (observing that 1988 refugee
admissions from Soviet Union to United States increased over previous year's admissions by
552%, comprising 27% of total United States refugee intake, up from only 6% of total refu-
gees admitted in 1987); see also id. (noting that in light of numerical ceiling imposed on reset-
tlement in United States, great influx of Soviet refugees has had detrimental effect on number
of refugees coming from Southeast Asia); id. (stating that in December 1988, 7000 spaces
allocated to refugees from Southeast Asia and Middle East were reallocated to accommodate
Soviet emigres).
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especially keen.25 The net result is a deterioration in the commit-
ment of the United States and other countries to resettling South-
east Asian reftigees. 26 First asylum countries, on the other hand, are
concerned that in light of the withering commitment to the resettle-
ment of Southeast Asian refugees, they will stand alone, saddled in-
definitely with the responsibility of caring for and determining the
future of asylum seekers within their borders.
A. The Vietnamese
A most pressing humanitarian concern and the focus of this Com-
ment is the plight of the Vietnamese "boat people" currently resid-
ing in detention centers in Hong Kong. Since 1975, asylum seekers
have secretly and illegally departed from Vietnam, crowded upon
tiny, unseaworthy boats, in search of asylum and eventual resettle-
ment in the West.2 7 The boat people's voyages are extremely dan-
gerous. 28 In Hong Kong, officials estimate that about half the
asylum seekers who depart Vietnam by boat never reach land,29
while others estimate that between twenty and thirty percent of
those fleeing perish at sea. 30 In addition to the natural obstacles
presented by the open sea and the long distances covered, asylum
25. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGE DENIED: PROBLEMS IN THE
PROTECTION OF VIETNAMESE AND CAMBODIANS IN THAILAND AND THE ADMISSION OF IN-
DOCHINESE REFUGEES INTO THE UNITED STATES 95 (1989) [hereinafter REFUGE DENIED] (stat-
ing that number of spaces allocated to Southeast Asians for resettlement in United States has
steadily declined from 169,200 in 1980 to only 53,000 in 1988); Stephen Moore, Flee Market;
More Refugees at Lower Cost, HERITAGE FOUND. POL'Y REV., No. 52, at 64 (1990), available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (reporting that in 1990, United States admitted roughly one-
half total number of international refugees allowed to enter in 1981 and less than one-fifth
total number that was admitted at turn of 19th century).
26. See Al Kamen, Cold War Consensus on Refugee Aid Ebbing Despite Relentless Need, WASH.
PosT,July 20, 1992, at A8 (commenting that because of end of Cold War, United States com-
mitment to relocating refugees has dwindled, and further asserting that improved relations
between U.S. and Vietnamese Governments have led to reduced numbers of Vietnamese
granted asylum in West); see also Voting with Their Feet, Their Trabants and Their Oars, ECONOMIST,
Dec. 23, 1989, at 17, 22 (explaining that while United States has admitted 900,000
Vietnamese since 1975, nation's hospitality is wearing thin, though not as thin as that of other
countries).
27. See INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 7-8 (stating that since 1975, over one
million Vietnamese have escaped from Vietnam by boat in search of asylum in other countries
of Southeast Asia and ultimately in West).
28. See Christine Courtney, The Dreams of a Better Life Sail Away for 'Boat People', L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 1991, at Al, A4 (commenting that travel by "rickety boat" might be cheapest
way to leave Vietnam, but is also most hazardous due to natural dangers of sea and attacks by
pirates); Seth Mydans, Pirate Attacks on Vietnam Refugees Fall Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1987,
§ 1, at 22 (observing that although maritime attacks on boat people have dramatically de-
creased in number since 1981, violent assaults are still serious problem).
29. See John Saar, Boat People Backlash, NEWSWEEK, June 25, 1979, at 55 (stating that ap-
proximate 50% mortality rate reported by Hong Kong officials for asylum seekers is horrify-
ing, considering fact that hundreds of thousands of people are involved, and noting that
tragedy is comparable in scale to tragedy of Vietnam War).
30. Id.
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seekers also face the danger of pirates who infest the waters of the
South China Sea, often raping Vietnamese women and girls, de-
stroying boats, and killing the occupants. 3'
From 1980 to 1985, the number of Vietnamese asylum seekers
arriving by boat in Hong Kong and other countries of first asylum
consistently dwindled. 32 The number of arrivals roughly matched
the number of Vietnamese sent from Hong Kong to resettlement
countries such as the United States, Canada, France, or Australia.
3
By 1986, however, this trend abruptly reversed and the number of
arrivals surged upward, while departures from Hong Kong camps
simultaneously declined.3 4 This tendency continued into the 1990s,
resulting in the present situation: 60,000 Vietnamese asylum seek-
ers are crowded into the camps of Hong Kong alone, with tens of
thousands more spread throughout other countries of first asylum.3 5
The upsurge in arrivals in the late 1980s produced dour conse-
quences as some countries of first asylum reacted harshly to the in-
flux of new arrivals. Thailand and Malaysia, for example, the
countries closest to Vietnam by boat, publicly announced policies of
"pushing off" asylum seekers who arrived at their shores, or of in-
tercepting boats a few miles off the coast and towing them back out
to sea.3 6 Furthermore, the forced repatriation of asylum seekers,
31. See, e.g., REFUGE DENIED, supra note 25, at 78-82 (recounting abuse, rape, and murder
of Vietnamese boat people committed by Thai pirates and fishermen in South China Sea); 130
Are Said to Die in Pirate Attack on Vietnamese Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1989, § 1, at 11 (detail-
ing massacre of 130 Vietnamese refugees by pirates off Malaysian coast).
32. See INHUMANE DErERRENCE, supra note 3, at 8 (noting that Vietnamese arrivals in
Hong Kong dropped steadily from high of 6788 in 1980 to only 1112 in 1985).
33. See Court Robinson, Sins of Omission: The New Vietnamese Refugee Crisis, in 1988 WORLD
REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 6 (calculating that between 1980 and 1985, number of de-
partures of Vietnamese nationals from Hong Kong detention camps was greater than number
of arrivals and population in camps actually began to dwindle).
34. See INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 8 (reporting that while number of asylum
seekers admitted by resettlement countries began to decrease, number of boat people arriving
in Thailand and Hong Kong more than tripled between 1986 and 1988); Still They Come, ECON-
OMIsT, May 6, 1989, at 36 (observing that while number of boat people arriving in Hong Kong
in 1987 was 65% higher than in 1986, number of refugees departing for resettlement was
42% lower than in 1986).
35. See At the Heart of Vietnam: Old Dogma and New Possibility, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1991, at
B6 (reporting that 64,000 boat people are currently living in Hong Kong detention camps);
Mann, supra note 5, at A14 (stating that more than 110,000 boat people reside in first asylum
camps throughout Southeast Asia).
36. See 1991 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 64 (stating that in March 1990,
Malaysian navy and marine police pushed off more than 90%o of Vietnamese asylum seekers
and that in July 1990, not one asylum seeker landed safely); Court Robinson, Sins of Omission:
The New Vietnamese Refugee Crisis, in 1988 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 6 (noting
that on January 28, 1988, Thai Minister of Interior announced that any Vietnamese asylum
seekers arriving in Thailand by boat would be pushed back to sea, and commenting that in
following months, 2300 Vietnamese were pushed back, resulting in more than 200 deaths);
Mann, supra note 5, at A14 (noting that since March 1989, Malaysia has "redirected" or
"pushed off" over 8000 Vietnamese asylum seekers, sending them back out to sea); The Boat
People Are Shown the Gang-Plank, ECONOMIST, Mar. 18, 1989, at 29 (reporting that Thailand, as
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once thought internationally unacceptable, began to be earnestly
considered by countries of first asylum.
37
In response to the reality of "push offs," the threat of unilateral
forced repatriations, and the dilemma of huge numbers of
Vietnamese asylum seekers living indefinitely in camps of first asy-
lum, the United Nations convened an international conference in
Geneva in June 1989 to search for a solution to the renewed out-
pouring of asylum seekers from Vietnam.3 8 Sixty countries, includ-
part of its pushback policy, had deliberately rammed and fired on boats of Vietnamese asylum
seekers).
37. See Mann, supra note 5, at A14 (explaining that members of Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), including Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and
Brunei, agreed that in order to safeguard national security, they would refuse to accept new
asylum seekers and would force those already present in ASEAN countries to return to Viet-
nam and Cambodia unless ASEAN countries received help from United States). Because of
this pressure from ASEAN, the United States has acquiesced, for the first time, in the return
to Vietnam of persons who "do not object" to repatriation. Id. Unfortunately, however, once
first asylum governments determine that particular asylum seekers' motivation for emigrating
is economic rather than political, the governments are more and more inclined to forcibly
repatriate those people. See, e.g., INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 20 (commenting that
Hong Kong explicitly warns migrants that those found to be economic refugees will be forci-
bly returned to Vietnam and will not be resettled in Hong Kong). Such a policy is currently
being executed by Hang Kong and the United Kingdom with regard to screened-out
Vietnamese asylum seekers. See Paul Lewis, U.S. Pressed To Pay for Boat People in Hong Kong,
N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 11, 1990, § 1, at 8 (discussing proposal by United Kingdom to forcibly
repatriate Vietnamese asylum seekers residing in Hong Kong who do not qualify as refugees
under international law, and noting that United Kingdom intends to implement plan, even
without international endorsement, once arrangements are completed with Vietnam, includ-
ing provisions for monitoring of returned refugees by international agencies); see also Boat
People; Pushed Too Far, ECONOMIST, June 23, 1990, at 32 (commenting that first asylum coun-
tries in Southeast Asia want to send Vietnamese asylum seekers back to Vietnam against their
will, despite objections from Vietnam and United States). Forced repatriation thus far has
taken place on a sporadic basis, however. See William Stewart, Dashing Their Dreams; Britain
Begins the Forced Repatriation of the Boat People, TIME, Dec. 25, 1989, at 26 (detailing forced
repatriation of 51 asylum seekers and noting that United Kingdom paid Vietnam $620 for
each returning boat person in exchange for promise that returnees would not be persecuted
in their native land). In response to this incident, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater
denounced repatriation as "unacceptable until conditions in Vietnam improve[,]" while the
United Kingdom's Labour Party leader, Neil Kinnock, characterized the repatriation as a
"shameful episode." Id.
38. See Le Xuan Khoa, Forced Repatriation of Asylun-Seekers: The Case of Hong Kong, 2 INT'LJ.
REFUGEE LAW 137, 137-38 (1990) (explaining that U.N. conference materialized in direct re-
sponse to growing refugee crisis in Southeast Asia). This conference was the second confer-
ence convened by the international community to address refugee flows from Southeast Asia
and, in particular, from Vietnam. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) convened the first conference in Geneva onJuly 20, 1979, to address the plight of
200,000 asylum seekers who had fled Vietnam and arrived in countries of first asylum during
1979. JANELLE M. DILLER, INDOCHINA RESOURCE ACTION CTR., IN SEARCH OF ASYLUM:
VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE IN HONG KONG 9-10 (1988). At the meeting, representatives of the
65 countries present agreed that resettlement countries such as the United States, Australia,
France, Canada, and the United Kingdom would increase the numbers of refugees they would
resettle in exchange for a promise on the part of ASEAN and Hong Kong to provide tempo-
rary refuge or "first asylum" to refugees arriving at their borders. Id. at 10. Vietnam, for its
part, agreed to make "every effort to stop illegal departures ... for a reasonable period of
time" and to implement an "Orderly Departure Program," or "ODP." Id. ODP allows for the
orderly and safe emigration of refugees based on grounds of family unification and other
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ing the United Kingdom, the United States, and Vietnam, 39 agreed
during the conference to implement a "Comprehensive Plan of Ac-
tion" in order to stem the flow of asylum seekers and preserve the
principle of first asylum. The plan called for an end to push offs, 40
allowed for the implementation of systematic screening proce-
dures41 by countries of first asylum as a means to determine whether
asylum seekers met the legal requirements of refugee status, and
produced a renewed commitment on the part of resettlement coun-
tries to ensure that persons "screened in" would continue to be re-
settled. 42 The plan was ambiguous with respect to persons
"screened out," or deemed to be economic migrants, 43 stating only
humanitarian concerns. Id. at 11. In the decade ending January 1990, over 130,000
Vietnamese entered the United States by virtue of the ODP program. 1991 WORLD REFUGEE
SURVEY, supra note 1, at 67.
39. See Action Plan Set at 60-Nation Parley, FACTS ON FILE, WORLD NEWS DIGEST, June 23,
1989, at 453, A3 (asserting that primary goal of conference's Comprehensive Plan of Action
(CPA) was to stop flow of refugees fleeing from Vietnam to Hong Kong and other Southeast
Asian countries).
40. See STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM. ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE AFFAIRS, 101ST CONG.,
lST SESS., INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INDO-CHINESE REFUGEES 1-2 (Comm. Print 1989)
(commenting that CPA called for all asylum seekers to be granted temporary asylum and not
be sent back to Vietnam before screening); Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that
CPA reaffirmed principle of first asylum, which calls for grant of temporary asylum and termi-
nation of push-off policies).
41. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 9, at 20 (observing that design and implementation of
procedures for determining refugee status within context of 1951 Convention and 1967 Pro-
tocol are left to individual nations); see also AMNESTY INT'L, MEMORANDUM TO THE GOVERN-
MENTS OF HONG KONG AND THE UNITED KINGDOM REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF VIETNAMESE
ASYLUM SEEKERS IN HONG KONG 6 (1990) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM] (stating that screening
system must identify all individuals who would be subject to human rights violations if re-
turned to Vietnam and must grant them refugee status); id. at 5 (noting Hong Kong's agree-
ment to apply "appropriate humanitarian criteria for determining refugee status" and to
follow criteria of U.N. Handbook when screening asylum seekers for determination of refugee
status); DILLER, supra note 38, at 19 (establishing that UNHCR agreed to monitor screening
processes and to arrange for procurement of legal advice for those appealing screening deter-
minations); INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 20 (stating that screening procedures of
Hong Kong must comply with 1951 Convention, 1967 Protocol, and U.N. Handbook); Indefinite
Detention, supra note 7, at 6 (outlining Hong Kong's screening procedures for determining
refugee status).
42. See Henry Kamm, Britain and Vietnam Still at Odds on Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, June 15,
1989, at A19 (reporting that CPA received unanimous approval from participating countries,
established requirements for screening boat people, and endorsed voluntary repatriation for
those who failed screening processes); see also DILLER, supra note 38, at 15 (noting that June
16, 1988, was last day that persons arriving in Hong Kong would automatically be granted
refugee status); Diana D. Bui, Hong Kong: The Other Story: The Situation of Women and Children in
Hong Kong's Detention Centres, INDOCHINA RESOURCE ACTION CENTER, Mar. 1990, at I n. I (ex-
plaining that refugee status is conferred on asylum seekers in Hong Kong either by virtue of
their arrival in colony prior to June 16, 1988 refugee "cut-off" date or by way of screening
process).
43. See Boat People; Pushed Too Far, supra note 37, at 32 (commenting that execution of
CPA did not end emigration from Vietnam and did not resolve dilemma of thousands of
Vietnamese asylum seekers who maintain that they are legitimate refugees and not merely
"economic migrants" and therefore refuse to go home); Kamm, supra note 4t2, at A19 (point-
ing out that CPA did not answer crucial question regarding disposition ofpersons likely to be
refused refugee status yet unwilling to return to their homelands).
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that screened-out persons would be returned to Vietnam " 'in ac-
cordance with international practices.' "44 The plan did, however,
endorse the voluntary repatriation of asylum seekers wishing to re-
turn to Vietnam. 4
5
After the conference, however, there was disagreement among
various competing parties regarding the fate of screened-out asylum
seekers. Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations46 argued that the meeting sanctioned, at
least in principle, the forced repatriation of screened-out asylum
seekers. 47 The United States rejected the notion that such a consen-
sus was reached and remained strongly opposed to forcibly re-
turning any Vietnamese asylum seekers until conditions in Vietnam
improve.48 Despite the objections by the United States, Hong Kong
proceeded to carry out forced repatriations of screened-out asylum
seekers, at least on a sporadic basis.4 9
B. Forced Repatriation
The first forced repatriation of screened-out asylum seekers in-
volved fifty-one persons returned to Vietnam in December 1989.50
As part of an agreement with Vietnam, the United Kingdom paid
Vietnam $620 for each boat person Vietnam would accept from the
Hong Kong camps. 51 These acts of forcible repatriation received
sharp criticism from around the world, particularly from the United
44. Khoa, supra note 38, at 139 (quoting Comprehensive Plan of Action, 1 IJRL 574
(1989)).
45. See Kamm, supra note 42, at A19 (reporting that CPA endorsed voluntary repatriation
for screened-out asylum seekers); see also Khoa, supra note 38, at 139 (observing that although
CPA officially endorsed voluntary repatriation, vague wording of endorsement allowed coun-
tries dissatisfied with progress of voluntary repatriation to resort to forcible repatriation).
46. See Mann, supra note 5, at A14 (explaining that ASEAN includes countries of Malay-
sia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, and Brunei).
47. See Mann, supra note 5, at A14 (observing that governments of Asian nations and
United Kingdom are annoyed with refusal of United States to accept principle that boat peo-
ple should be returned to Vietnam and Cambodia and noting that members of ASEAN have
adopted resolution condemning United States for its refusal).
48. See Lafontant, supra note 15 (indicating that United States objects to forced repatria-
tion of refugees to repressive countries such as Vietnam); Mann, supra note 5, at A14 (noting
that Bush administration opposes forced repatriation of Vietnamese boat people).
49. See infra notes 50, 53 and accompanying text (describing forcible repatriations of
Vietnamese from Hong Kong).
50. See Stewart, supra note 37, at 26 (noting that on December 12, 1989, 51 Vietnamese
boat people, including 17 women and 26 children, were rounded up at 3:00 a.m., loaded into
trucks, taken to Kai Tak Airport, and put aboard plane to Hanoi, Vietnam); see also Sheila
Rule, Hong Kong and Britain Faulted on Boat People, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1990, at A3 (observing
that during forced repatriation on December 12, 1989, Hong Kong officers utilized physical
force, including partial strangulation, kicks, and beatings, to subdue asylum seekers so that
they would board trucks and planes).
51. See Stewart, supra note 37, at 26 (noting that money paid was in exchange for promise
that returnees would not be persecuted).
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States. 52 Despite the outcry, however, the repatriations continued.
In November of 1991, pursuant to another agreement between Viet-
nam and Hong Kong's British Government, fifty-nine Vietnamese,
including sixteen women and twenty-three children, were forcibly
repatriated to Vietnam. 53 This group consisted of "double-back-
ers," or persons who had previously accepted cash incentive pay-
ments and volunteered to return to Vietnam,54 only to again return
to Hong Kong.55 Furthermore, two additional agreements signed
52. See Chris Moncrieff, Boat People: Vietnam Flights "Set to Resume," Press Ass'n Newslile,
Dec. 13, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (reporting that President Bush
condemned forcible repatriation as "unacceptable" while Claiborne Pell, chair of Foreign Re-
lations Committee in U.S. Senate, asserted that repatriation was disgrace that could be dam-
aging to United Kingdom's relations abroad, and noting that Robert Van Leeuwen, member
of international organization that monitors conditions in Hong Kong refugee camps and pro-
tects refugee interests, said his organization "deplored" forced repatriations).
53. Refugees at Risk: Forced Repatriation of Vietnamese from Hong Kong, ASIA WATCH, Aug. 2,
1992, at I n.2 [hereinafter Refugees at Risk]; see Barbara Basler, Hong Kong Begins To Transport
Vietnam Boat People back Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1991, § 1, at 1 (describing ways in which
Vietnamese asylum seekers were led, carried, shoved, or dragged aboard plane heading to
Hanoi). Many of those forced to return showed little violent resistance, although some
draped themselves in red blankets as a sign of protest. Id
54. See Kathleen Callo, Boat People Fled to H.K for Money, Say Vietnamese Oflcials, Reuter
Libr. Rep., Oct. 23, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (reporting that
UNHCR provided each asylum seeker who voluntarily returned to Vietnam $410 to help in
his or her reintegration into Vietnamese society, and noting that payments have recently been
reduced because they became incentive for citizens to leave Vietnam and "voluntarily" re-
turn); see also At the Heart of Vietnam: Old Dogma and New Possibility, L.A. TIME:;, Oct. 24, 1991, at
B6 (noting that Vietnam's per capita income is less than $200 per year, which is less than half
of $410 that UNHCR pays to asylum seekers who voluntarily return to Vietnam from Hong
Kong); Courtney, supra note 28, at Al (explaining that double-backers are persons who left
Hong Kong once and returned again to receive money incentive to leave for Vietnam).
55. Basler, supra note 53, at 1; cf Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 23 (pointing out that
double-backers are at particular risk if returned home second time because they are more
likely to be punished).
The United States is receiving criticism because of a perceived double standard regarding
the forced repatriation of Haitian asylum seekers who have sought refuge in the United States.
See, e.g., LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHrs, REFUGEE REFOULEMENT: THE FORCED RETURN
OF HAITIANS UNDER THE U.S.-HAMAN INTERDICTION AGREEMENT 7 (1990) [hereinafter REFU-
GEE REFOULEMENT] (concluding that screening procedures used by United States are inade-
quate to evaluate asylum claims of Haitians and as a result, Haitians' forced return to their
native land violates principles of international law); Britain, Vietnam to Hold Talks on More Repa-
triations, Agence France Presse, Nov. 19, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File
(indicating that Hong Kong legislators have condemned United States for repatriating Haitian
boat people while at same time vehemently opposing repatriation of Vietnamese boat peo-
ple); Refugees from Haiti: Boat People, ECONOMIST, Nov. 23, 1991, at 33, [hereinafter Refugess
from Haiti] (stating that UNHCR Sadako Ogata criticized unilateral decision by United States
to repatriate Haitians). See also Howard W. French, First Boats of Refugees Land in Haiti, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 1992, at A3 (indicating that U.S. officials insist that most of 15,000 Haitians
intercepted by U.S. Coast Guard since September 30, 1991 military coup in Haiti are eco-
nomic refugees who are ineligible for political asylum); Al Kamen, Haitians Appear Resigned to
Repatriation, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1992, at Al (discussing repatriation of Haitian boat people
and noting that of more than 15,000 such persons intercepted by authorities, only 3400 or
30% have been found likely to be true political refugees).
The issue of forced repatriation of Haitians has sparked disagreement among courts in the
United States. See Al Kamen, Supreme Court Clears Way for Forced Return of Haitian Boat People,
WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1992, at A3 (noting that while U.S. DistrictJudge C. Clyde Atkins issued
stay temporarily halting forced repatriation of Haitian asylum seekers, stay was lifted by six to
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by Vietnam and Hong Kong provide for the repatriation of all asy-
lum seekers whose claims for refugee status are rejected. 56 Hong
Kong plans to continue the policy of forcibly repatriating to Viet-
nam all screened-out asylum seekers, who comprise the majority of
the 60,000 or so Vietnamese residing in Hong Kong.57
II. PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT
State responsibility to asylum seekers is primarily defined in two
documents: the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating *to the
Status of Refugees (1951 Convention)58 and the 1967 United Na-
tions Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol).59
Additionally, the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
three ruling of Supreme Court on emergency petition filed by Bush administration); see also
High Court: U.S. Can Ship Out Haitians, Cm. TRIB., Feb. 2, 1992, at C22 (explaining that
Supreme Court ruling provides Bush administration legal authority to begin repatriating Hai-
tians while repatriation issue is being argued before U.S. Court of Appeals for Eleventh Cir-
cuit in Atlanta). The Haitian controversy has focused international attention on the issue of
forced repatriation. See Refugees from Haiti, supra, at 33 (commenting that UNHCR has criti-
cized U.S. policy of forced repatriation of Haitian asylum seekers, and noting that Venezuela,
Honduras, Belize, and Trinidad and Tobago have been willing to accept some Haitian asylum
seekers).
56. On October 29, 1991, Hong Kong and Vietnam signed an agreement providing for
the repatriation of all screened-out Vietnamese who arrived in Hong Kong on or after that
date. Refugees at Risk, supra note 53, at 1 n.2. On May 12, 1992, these nations concluded a
final agreement with the United Kingdom providing for the repatriation of all screened-out
asylum seekers taking refuge in Hong Kong prior to October 29, 1991 as well. Id
57. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 41, at 1 (reporting that Hong Kong's Government plans
to forcibly return asylum seekers that are screened out); Stewart, supra note 37, at 26 (indicat-
ing that United Kingdom announced that mass forced repatriations of Vietnamese boat peo-
ple will transpire); Lewis, supra note 37, § 1, at 8 (commenting that United Kingdom will
proceed with plan to forcibly repatriate boat people despite lack of international approval).
58. See 1951 Convention, supra note 4, art. 3-34, at 6264-76 (addressing issues relating to
refugees, such as discrimination, continuity of residence, access to courts, employment, and
expulsion, in effort to increase and guarantee protection of refugees); see also 1991 WORLD
REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 31 (noting that signatories to 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol include: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bo-
livia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Brazil, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad,
Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gam-
bia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Hungary,
Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica,Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Lux-
embourg, Malawi, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal,
Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan,
Suriname, Sweden, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Kingdom, Uru-
guay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; that nonmembers of United Nations
who have signed include Vatican, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland; and that signatories to Con-
vention and not Protocol include Madagascar, Monaco, Mozambique, Samoa, and Western
Samoa).
59. See 1967 Protocol, supra note 4, arts. I-I, 19 U.S.T. at 6225-26, 606 U.N.T.S. at 268-
70 (amending 1951 Convention to include persons who become refugees as result of events
occurring after January 1, 1951); see also 1991 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 31
(listing Canada, Cape Verde, Swaziland, United States, and Venezuela as countries that are
signatories to Protocol only and not to 1951 Convention).
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Refugees Status (U.N. Handbook), published by the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), is considered
the authoritative document interpreting the 1951 Convention and
1967 Protocol. 60 The most important articles contained in these
documents are those related to refoulement, or the involuntary repa-
triation of refugees.
61
Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention asserts that "[n]o Con-
tracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where [the refu-
gee's] life or freedom would be threatened." 62 This doctrine of non-
refoulement does not prohibit a nation from expelling a refugee from
its territory, but rather forbids the refoulement or return of a refugee
to any country or territory where the refugee's life or freedom
would be endangered.
63
The principle of non-refoulement applies to Hong Kong, even
though Hong Kong is not bound as a signatory to the 1951 Conven-
tion or the 1967 Protocol, 64 because non-refoulement is a customary
norm of international law. 65 Norms of international law evolve as
60. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at I (explaining that United Nations issued Hand-
book in response to request by Executive Committee of High Commissioner's Programme for
manual that would set forth procedures and criteria for governments to use in determining
refugee status); see also id. (stating that explanations provided in Handbook are derived from
information collected by Office of High Commissioner since April 22, 1954, effective date of
1951 Convention, including states' practices and procedures with respect to determination of
refugee status, continuing dialogue between Office and authorities of contracting nations, and
literature produced since April 1954 that addresses situation of refugees).
61. See 1951 Convention, supra note 4, art. 42(1), 189 U.N.T.S. at 182 (prohibiting reser-
vations regarding article 33 of 1951 Convention, which requires signatory nations to observe
non-refoulement); REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 55, at 7 (positing that principle of non-
refoulement is fundamental interest protected by 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol);
STENBERG, supra note 6, at 171 (asserting that concept of non-refoulement constitutes heart of
international refugee law).
62. 1951 Convention, supra note 4, art. 33, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
63. 1951 Convention, supra note 4, art. 33, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176; see STENBERG, supra note
6, at 171 (stating that to comply with principle of non-refoulement, refugee must not be sent to
country where risk of persecution exists for that individual on basis of criteria in Convention
and Protocol).
64. See 1991 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 31 (indicating that Hong Kong is
not on list of signatories to 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol).
65. See REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 55, at 58 (asserting that non-refoulenent is un-
disputed peremptory norm of international law); see also King, supra note 10, at 787-94 (argu-
ing that non-refoulenent is customary norm of international law under test established by
International Court of Justice in North Sea Continental Shelf Cases because of its "norm-
creating" character and because nations' practices regarding non-refoulement are extensive, uni-
form, and reflect sense of legal obligation). A number of international agreements and docu-
ments support the conclusion that non-refoulement is a customary norm of international law.
For example, article II of the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention prohibits na-
tions from denying entry to or expelling asylum seekers, which forces asylum seekers to re-
turn to or remain in territories in which they face risks of persecution. Organization of
African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
adopted Mar. 31, 1976, art. 11(3), 1001 U.N.T.S. 45, 48. The U.N. Declaration on Territorial
Asylum similarly directs that asylum seekers may not be rejected at national frontiers and, if
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the result of general and consistent practices followed by states out
of a sense of legal obligation. 66 All states, unless they persistently
object to a norm of customary law during its formation, 67 are bound
by such norms.68 Hong Kong, as a member of the international
community that has not persistently opposed the norm of non-refoule-
ment, is obligated to observe the principle.6 9 Additionally, Hong
Kong explicitly agreed in the context of the Comprehensive Plan of
Action70 to conduct its policy regarding Vietnamese asylum seekers
under principles embodied in the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Proto-
col, and the U.N. Handbook.71
Hong Kong has not taken the position that it is not bound under
international law to respect the principle of non-refoulement.72
Rather, Hong Kong argues that because non-refoulement applies only
to persons who meet the legal definition of "refugee,"73 persons
they have already entered the country in which they are seeking asylum, may not be expelled
from that territory or returned to any country in which risks of persecution based on their
race, nationality, religion, social status, or political opinion exist. U.N. Declaration on Territorial
Asylum, G.A. Res. 2312, U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6716
(1968). The American Convention on Human Rights also states that an alien may not be
deported or returned to any country where there is a threat to that person's life or liberty
based on race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or social status. American Convention on
Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 22(8), O.A.S./Official Records OEA/SER. K/XVI/I.1, Doc.
65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1,Jan. 7, 1970, rerinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) and in 65 AJ.I.L. 679 (1971).
66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(l)-(2) (1986) (defining
rule of international law as standard that international community accepts through interna-
tional agreement, as general legal principle commonly used throughout international commu-
nity, or as custom arising from sense of legal obligation that is exercised in common and
consistent practice).
67. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (2d ed. 1973) (ex-
plaining that for nation to "contract out" of customary norm during norm's formation, nation
must demonstrate clearly evidenced opposition to norm in order to rebut presumption of
acceptance).
68. See Statute of the International Court ofJustice, 1978 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 59 (stating
that court will apply "international custom[] as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law").
69. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 6 (arguing that Hong Kong is compelled to
observe principle of non-refoulement by virtue of United Nations statute requesting that govern-
ments cooperate with UNHCR in carrying out Commissioner's duties).
70. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 3 (describing CPA adopted at 1989 interna-
tional conference as program addressing issues of first asylum, determination of refugee sta-
tus, and options for return of nonrefugees to Vietnam); see also supra notes 39-40 and
accompanying text (discussing various interpretations of CPA regarding Vietnamese
refugees).
71. Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 6. But see DILLER, supra note 38, at 67 (commenting
that duty to apply UNHCR guidelines set out in U.N. Handbook has not been honored by Hong
Kong policies and practices with respect to Vietnamese).
72. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 41, at 5 (reporting statement by Hong Kong Govern-
ment that refugee status will be determined and refugees treated in accordance with interna-
tional standards, including standard of non-refoulement defined in 1951 Convention and 1967
Protocol).
73. See 1951 Convention, supra note 4, art. 1, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152 (defining "refugee" as
individual who, out of fear of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, membership
in particular group, or political opinion, is unable or unwilling to remain in or return to coun-
try of origin).
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deemed to be economic migrants are not entitled to such protec-
tion.74 Thus, Hong Kong contends that returning to Vietnam
screened-out asylum seekers, those determined to be economic mi-
grants, does not constitute refoulement and is not a violation of inter-
national law.
75
A. Screening by Hong Kong
Before June of 1988, all Vietnamese boat people who fled to
Hong Kong were automatically presumed to meet the legal require-
ments for recognition as a refugee. 76 As a result, these "refugees"
became protected under international law from refoulement to Viet-
nam and were eligible for resettlement in third countries. 77 On
June 15, 1988, however, in response to dramatic increases in boat
arrivals, Hong Kong officials began to screen asylum seekers on a
case-by-case basis to determine whether they should be recognized,
under international law, as "refugees. '78
In the screening interviews of asylum applicants, Hong Kong ex-
aminers ask questions focusing primarily on the applicant's motive
74. See Adrifit on a Sea of Principle, ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 1990, at 35 (reporting Hong Kong's
policy of separating economic migrants to be returned to Vietnam from genuine refugees who
are entitled to asylum); Dan Thomas, Lawyers Attack Hong Kong's System for Screening Asylum
Seekers, Reuter Libr. Rep., Dec. 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (indicat-
ing that Hong Kong defends its policy of returning economic emigres on grounds that such
emigres do not suffer politically based persecution and thus are ineligible for resettlement).
See generally U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 62 (establishing that persons leaving their
homelands for economic reasons are considered economic migrants and not refugees).
75. See Denise Young, H.K to Resume Forced Deportation of Vietnamese, Reuter Libr. Rep.,
May 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (reporting Hong Kong's practice
of returning economic migrants to Vietnam as permitted by 1989 Geneva international agree-
ment stipulating that those not meeting refugee criteria must be returned home); see also Dan
Thomas, Hong Kong Deports 28 More Vietnamese Boat People, Reuter Libr. Rep., Dec. 10, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires Files (discussing intention by Hong Kong Govern-
ment to continue forcible return of asylum seekers who do not qualify as refugees).
76. See INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 3 (stating that asylum seekers who arrived
in Hong Kong betweenJuly 2, 1982 and June 15, 1988 were presumed to be refugees, while
those arriving on or afterJune 16, 1988 are considered illegal immigrants who must be indi-
vidually screened to determine refugee status); see also DILLER, supra note 38, at 15 (noting that
as ofJune 16, 1988, asylum seekers would not be considered refugees until determined to be
so by individualized screening process); Still They Come, ECONOMIST, May 6, 1989, at 36 (re-
porting that Hong Kong's legislature decreed that asylum seekers arriving later than June 15,
1988 are no longer presumed political refugees but must undergo screening to determine
their status).
77. MEMORANDUM, supra note 41, at 5.
78. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 41, at 13 (describing procedure by which asylum seek-
ers initially screened out can become "mandate refugees," persons deemed by UNHCR to fit
1951 Convention definition of "refugee," and thus avoid forced repatriation by Hong Kong
Government); 1991 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 62 (reporting that between June
1988 and December 1990, Hong Kong authorities screened in 3800 Vietnamese as "refu-
gees" and screened out 14,100 as economic migrants, who immediately became subject to
repatriation to Vietnam); id. (noting existence of 20% screening approval rate after appeal
process). See generally supra note 4 and accompanying text (providing international legal defi-
nition of "refugee").
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for departing Vietnam. The examiners are most interested in as-
sessing whether the applicant was persecuted in the past by the
Vietnamese Government for reasons described in the 1951 Conven-
tion.7 9 Toward this end, examiners inquire into prior military ser-
vice, the cultural, geographic, and political background of the
applicant and family members, involvement in political organiza-
tions or resistance groups, religious activities, and any other evi-
dence that indicates past persecution by Vietnamese Government
officials.8 0 If the applicant can establish a motive for leaving based
on persecution, such as governmental denial of employment, educa-
tion, or a business license, forced relocation to a "New Economic
Zone,"' 81 internment in a re-education camp, prison, or torture, and
if the applicant shows that such persecution took place because of
the applicant's race, religion, political opinion, social group, or na-
tionality, then there is a chance that the applicant will be recognized
as a refugee.8 2 If past persecution cannot be established, however,
the examiner will conclude almost invariably that the asylum
seeker's flight was motivated by economic considerations. 83 Where
economic betterment motivates an applicant's departure, the appli-
cant is classified by Hong Kong as an economic migrant and refugee
status is denied.
8 4
79. See DILLER, supra note 38, app. D (reproducing interview form and questions asked
during screening interviews; questions relate almost exclusively to activities within Vietnam of
applicant and applicant's family members).
80. See DILLER, supra note 38, app. D (presenting questions asked during screening); see
alS0 MEMORANDUM, supra note 41, at 8 (noting that interview format allows for interviewee's
input as to "any other points not covered" by standardized questions focusing on activities in
Vietnam, which may allow asylum seeker limited opportunity to discuss activities engaged in
since departure from Vietnam).
81. See DILLER, supra note 38, at 9 (defining New Economic Zone as government-created
agricultural zone where former property owners whose property has been confiscated by gov-
ernment are relocated to work).
82. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 45 (discussing presumption of well-founded
fear of persecution based on either actual past persecution or on perceived threat of persecu-
tion); STENBERG, supra note 6, at 67 (explaining that previous persecution of individual com-
bined with individual's membership in group that is subject to persecution establish definitive
ground for well-founded fear of persecution, and noting that showing of risk of persecution
can also be sufficient to establish well-founded fear). See generally AMNESTY INT'L, CouNRY
DOSSIERS, VIETNAM: RENOVATION (Doi Mol), THE LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE 1980s 2-24
(1990) [hereinafter VIETNAM: "RENOVATION"] (describing various forms of persecution that
exist in Vietnam and evaluating recent legal reforms and government policies that address
persecution); DILLER, supra note 38, at 9 (discussing use of re-education camps and New Eco-
nomic Zones by Vietnamese Government); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987-VIETNAM 828 (1987) (discussing persecution of Vietnamese citi-
zens, including political, economic, and cultural repression).
83. Cf Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 7 (reporting persistent complaint that inter-
viewers approach asylum seekers with presumption that applicants are economic migrants,
contravening UNHCR guidelines that require giving asylum seekers benefit of doubt where
applicant's statements are difficult to substantiate).
84. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 7 (distinguishing refugees from economic mi-
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Unfortunately, this analysis ignores the fact that many individuals
or subgroups of asylum seekers, having initially departed Vietnam
for economic reasons, may become political refugees during their
absence from Vietnam.8 5 People fitting this description are known
as "refugees sur place," or people whose technical refugee status
arises while they are away from their country of origin as a result of
circumstances often different from those initially triggering emigra-
tion.86 The U.N. Handbook, interpreting the 1951 Convention and
the 1967 Protocol, mandates that recognition under a refugee sur
place theory be fully considered.8 7 Because Hong Kong immigration
practice disregards this factor in most cases,88 the determination of
refugee status under the policy represents an overly narrow applica-
tion of the definition of "refugee" under the 1951 Convention and
1967 Protocol. Critics of forced repatriation argue that because of
this substantial flaw in Hong Kong's screening process,8 9 many refu-
grants and defining economic migrant as person who flees his or her homeland not in re-
sponse to persecution but as result of economic considerations).
85. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, paras. 94-96 (maintaining that person not initially
classified as refugee may become refugee when circumstances arise that present possibility of
persecution upon return, either because of person's actions outside homeland or because of
changes in political landscape of homeland); Daniel Wolf& Shep Lowman, The Boat People Still
Deserve Our Help; Hong Kong's "Screening" of Vietnamese Refugees Is a Farce, WAsH. PosT, Dec. 26,
1989, at A23 (positing that even if Hong Kong's screening process successfully identified
refugees, it should not be assumed that economic migrants can be safely returned to Vietnam,
as concern is not whether particular individual had good reason to leave but whether, because
of events since leaving Vietnam that give rise to potential for persecution, there is good rea-
son for individual to fear persecution upon return); see also Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at
12-13 (discussing case of Toan, 16-year-old boy who was denied refugee status despite leav-
ing Vietnam because of persecution resulting from his father's history of working for Ameri-
can companies and U.S. Air Force). Toan's case became widely publicized when he was
denied refugee status in Hong Kong. Indefinite Duration, supra note 7, at 13. As a result, gov-
ernment officials in Toan's hometown who previously did not know about his family back-
ground would probably have learned about it through the media. Id. Therefore, Toan
arguably falls within the refugee provisions in paragraphs 94-96 of the U.N. Handbook.
86. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 94.
87. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 96 (mandating thorough consideration of
circumstances to determine whether person has attained surplace refugee status); see also State-
ment of an Understanding Reached Between the Hong Kong Government and UAHCR Concerning the
Treatment of Asylum Seekers Arriving from Vietnam in Hong Kong (Sept. 20, 1988), reprinted in
DILLER, supra note 38, app. B [hereinafter Statement of Understanding] (noting Hong Kong Gov-
ernment's agreement to apply humanitarian standards in assessing refugee status in accord-
ance with UNHCR, 1951 Convention, and 1967 Protocol guidelines).
88. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 2 (reporting Hong Kong Government's failure
to protect from refoulement Vietnamese who qualify for refugee status because of circumstances
arising during absence from Vietnam). But see supra note 87 and accompanying text (indicat-
ing Hong Kong Government's agreement to assess refugee status according to international
guidelines).
89. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 7 (stating thai Hong Kong's screening process
has been attacked by human rights advocates since its inception and that Hong Kong follows
neither letter nor spirit of international law); see also INHUMANE DMRRENCE, supra note 3, at
21-26 (discussing Hong Kong's screening process and practice by UNHOR officials of moni-
toring screening interviews and estimating that such monitoring occurs only 20% of time). A
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights report cites "general attitude and bias" as another
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gees may be erroneously denied reftigee status and subjected to for-
cible repatriation to Vietnam. 90 Such a result places people at high
risk of being persecuted in Vietnam, 91 and consequently, critics as-
sert that the misclassification and return of asylum seekers violates
the norm of non-refoulement.9
2
B. Sur Place Refugee Status
According to the U.N. Handbook, an asylum seeker may qualify as a
refugee even if his or her initial motivation for leaving is not a well-
founded fear of persecution.93 The critical question is whether
there is a risk of persecution if a person is repatriated. 94 While the
fact that an applicant for asylum has previously experienced perse-
cution lends greater credibility to a claim of fear of future persecu-
tion,95 past persecution is not a prerequisite for obtaining refugee
status under international law.96 The United Nations, Hong Kong,
and the international community, under the 1951 Convention and
the 1967 Protocol, have an obligation to ensure that claims of sur
place refugee status are thoroughly considered before forcible repa-
fundamental problem among immigration examiners in Hong Kong. INHUMANE DETERRENCE,
supra note 3, at 22. Other criticisms include (1) the use of immigration enforcement officers
as examiners, because these officers lack experience in applying refugee criteria under the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol; (2) an "unimaginative" approach regarding the
questionnaire used to categorize asylum seekers; and (3) a flawed questionnaire that focuses
more on irrelevant information and less on fundamental questions concerning reasons for
flight and fear of persecution. Id.
90. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 41, at 6 (discussing requirement for impartial and effec-
tive screening process to adequately protect refugees according to international standards
and arguing that Hong Kong fails to meet such standards by mistakenly classifying actual
refugees as economic migrants).
91. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 41, at 25 (expressing concern that miscategorized ac-
tual refugees will be forcibly returned to Vietnam where they face potential human rights
abuses).
92. See DILLER, supra note 38, at 67 (asserting that duty ofnon-refoulement is not upheld by
Hong Kong because of shortcomings in screening process); Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at
8 (stating that because of apparent egregious errors caused by screening process, refoulement of
refugees is likely); INHUMANE DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 29 (indicating that despite changes
in screening process made pursuant to agreement between Hong Kong Government and
UNHCR, Hong Kong's screening procedures do not conform to UNHCR standards).
93. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 94.
94. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 96 (indicating importance of determining, for
purpose of gauging risk of persecution upon repatriation, way in which refugee is perceived
and treated by governmental authorities in country of origin); see also STENBERG, supra note 6,
at 64 (suggesting that conditions in applicant's home country that may give rise to risk of
retaliation against returning asylum seeker for actions while away from home country are
crucial to determining refugee status).
95. See STENBERG, supra note 6, at 64 (observing that proof of past persecution may give
rise to presumption of well-founded fear).
96. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 45 (stating that fear of persecution can be
based on perceived future possibility of persecution as well as past actual persecution); see also
STENBERG, supra note 6, at 64 (asserting that asylum seeker's lack of showing of persecution
experienced in native land does not preclude possibility that person is refugee).
1993] 449
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:433
triation of Vietnamese asylum seekers occurs.97
Many countries, including France, Germany, and the United
States, currently recognize and extend protection to sur place refu-
gees. 98 Sur place refugee status has been recognized in the asylum
claims of diplomats, prisoners of war, students, and migrant
workers.99 The following two cases, decided in the United States,
illustrate successful surplace refugee claims and are useful in under-
standing how sur place refugee criteria might be applied in the con-
text of Vietnamese asylum seekers in Hong Kong.
In Matter of Mogharrabi,100 the decision of the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals granting an Iranian student asylum in the United
States illustrates a court's recognition of a surplace refugee claim. In
1981, Mogharrabi, an Iranian student, went with a friend to the Ira-
nian Interests Section of the Algerian Embassy in the United
States.101 Mogharrabi sought to document his continuing status as
a student so that he could continue to obtain funds from relatives
overseas.10 2 At the Embassy, Mogharrabi and his friend had a polit-
ical disagreement with the student-employee who was helping
them.'0 3 The altercation ended with the student-employee telling
Mogharrabi's friend that he and "his kind had better keep their eyes
and ears open because 'their day' would come soon."' 1 4 Moghar-
rabi's friend responded by insulting the employee,10 5 the employee
drew a gun, and Mogharrabi and his friend fled the Embassy.
10 6
The court held that a reasonable person in Mogharrabi's circum-
97. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 96 (mandating careful investigation into pos-
sibility of attainment ofsur place refugee status prior to sending asylum seeker home against
his or her will); see also Statement of Understanding, supra note 87, app. B (indicating Hong Kong
Government's agreement to follow UNHCR guidelines for determination of refugee status as
set out in U.N. Handbook interpreting 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol).
98. See Refugees at Risk, supra note 53, at 2 (stating that recognition and protection of
refugees sur place is codified in statutes of many countries, including France, Germany, and
United States).
99. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 95.
100. 19 1. & N. Dec. 439 (1987).
101. Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 447 (1987).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 447-48. At the Embassy, Mogharrabi presented the student-employee with a
photocopy of his passport and arrival/departure record to facilitate the documentation of his
status. Id. at 448. The student-employee informed Mogharrabi that the originals of his docu-
ments were necessary because students without originals were assumed to have submitted
them to the INS pursuant to political asylum claims. Id. Mogharrabi's friend consequently
asked to see the student-employee's supervisor. Id. When the supervisor appeared, a fight
broke out between Mogharrabi's friend and the student-employee, who grabbed the friend
around the neck. Id.
104. Id
105. Id. Mogharrabi's friend replied that the student-employee and "his kind had robbed
Iran of all that was worth living for and that they were nothing more than religious fascists
stuffing their pockets with the nation's wealth." Id
106. Id.
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stances would fear persecution stemming from this incident if he or
she were returned to Iran.' 0 7 Noting that Mogharrabi's account of
why he feared persecution based on his political opinions was "plau-
sible, detailed, and coherent,"' 0 8 the court concluded that Moghar-
rabi had met his burden of showing a well-founded fear of
persecution if returned to Iran.' 0 9 Mogharrabi, however, did not
flee Iran because of a well-founded fear of persecution arising from
events transpiring in that country; instead, he feared return to Iran
because of a risk of persecution that arose during his absence. The
court did not require that Mogharrabi demonstrate past persecution
or otherwise show that he fled Iran because of a well-founded fear
of persecution. 110 Instead, the court focused on the applicant's
present subjective fear of persecution and whether such a fear was
reasonable in light of the objective circumstances. 11'
Similarly, the judicial recognition of refugee status of two Chinese
students who were studying overseas during the Tiananmen Square
massacre provides an example of recognition of a sur place refugee
claim. On June third and fourth of 1989, Chinese troops opened
fire on pro-democracy student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square
in Beijing, China. 112 The massacre shocked the international com-
munity and enraged many of the thousands of Chinese students
studying in the United States and elsewhere around the world."13
Consequently, there were protests, demonstrations, and rallies by
Chinese students throughout the United States and the world." 
4
Two Chinese students in particular, Luo Jian Guang and Hoy Yu
Yi, joined a rally that lasted for two days outside the Chinese Em-
bassy in Tokyo, Japan, during which time the students signed their
107. Id.
108. Id. A finding that a "reasonable" person would fear return to Iran indicates that
Mogharrabi's subjective fear was supported by objective circumstances.
109. Id. at 448-49.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Daniel Southerland, Death in Tiananmen; Witnesses Describe the Devastating Assault,
WASH. POST, June 5, 1989, at Al (reporting eyewitness accounts of massacre of Chinese stu-
dents). See generally Nicholas D. Kristof, Beijing Death Toll at Least 300; Army Tightens Control of
City but Angry Resistance Goes On, N.Y. TiMES, June 5, 1989, at Al (suggesting existence of
further military activity after incident at Tiananmen Square).
113. See, e.g., Fox Butterfield, Crackdown in Beijing; For Students in U.S., Grief and Fury, N.Y.
TiMES,June 5, 1989, at All (describing demonstrations and protests and virulent expressions
of outrage organized or exhibited by Chinese students in United States in response to massa-
cre); Robert D. McFadden, The West Condemns the Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1989, at A12
(discussing criticisms by many Western nations of Tiananmen Square massacre).
114. See Sandra G. Boodman, In the U.S., Tears and Defiance; 2,500 Rally Here at Chinese
Embassy, WASH. POST, June 5, 1989, at A21 (describing Chinese students' angry reactions
throughout United States to killings in Beijing); see also The West Condemns the Crackdown, supra
note 113, at A12 (reporting global extent of anguished demonstrations condemning
massacre).
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names to a petition protesting the massacre." 5 The petition was
later delivered to Chinese officials." 6 Additionally, Chinese officials
photographed the demonstration, and the students received anony-
mous threatening phone calls after the rally." 7 With the help of
students in Hong Kong, Guang and Yi were able to flee from Japan
to the United States, where they applied for political asylum.I" The
immigration judge ruling on their applications held that, as mem-
bers of the pro-democracy foreign student movement, Guang and
Yi had a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to China.' 9
Like the Iranian student in Mogharrabi, the Chinese students' well-
founded fears of persecution did not exist at or before the time they
left China, but arose as a result of their membership in a particular
social group and expression of their political opinions during their
absence from China. 20
III. THE NEED To RECOGNIZE SuR PLACE REFUGEE CLAIMS IN THE
CONTEXT OF VIETNAMESE ASYLUM SEEKERS
In order to comply with international refugee law as articulated in
the 1951 Convention, the 1967 Protocol, and interpreted by the
U.N. Handbook, Hong Kong must fully consider sur place refugee
claims of Vietnamese asylum applicants. To qualify for sur place ref-
ugee status, Vietnamese asylum seekers must meet the requirements
set out in the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol.' 2 ' The Con-
vention and Protocol mandate that a person be outside of the per-
son's country of nationality and, owing to a well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, or political opinion, be unwilling or
unable to return to the person's country. 122 While it is unlikely that
most Vietnamese asylum seekers in Hong Kong can qualify as refu-
115. See Chinese Dissident Students Granted Asylum in U.S., Reuter Libr. Rep., Oct. 6, 1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File [hereinafter Chinese Dissident Students] (relating
story of two Chinese students' plea for asylum).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Tearful Chinese Student 'Would Rather Die' Than Go Home, L.A. TINEs, Sept. 23, 1989,
at 27 (describing events surrounding two students' flight to United States;).
119. See Chinese Dissident Students, supra note 115 (reporting decision of immigration judge).
120. Cf U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 45 (stating that well-founded fear of persecu-
tion may be assumed not only from past actual persecution but also from perceived threat
stemming from political opinion or membership in particular social group).
121. See 1951 Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 152 (defining term "ref-
ugee"), as amended by 1967 Protocol, supra note 4, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606 U.N.T.S. at
268 (amending definition of "refugee" and defining "refugee sur place").
122. See 1951 Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 152 (listing require-
ments for refugee status), as amended by 1967 Protocol, supra note 4, art. 1, 19 U.S.T. at 6225,
606 U.N.T.S. at 268.
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gees sur place, there are individuals and subgroups of asylum seekers
who face, if forced to return to Vietnam, a significantly greater risk
of persecution than the population of asylum seekers as a whole be-
cause of the subgroup to which they belong or because of political
opinions they have expressed during their absence from Vietnam.
A. Requirement That Asylum Seeker Be Outside Country of Nationality
All Vietnamese asylum seekers in Hong Kong meet the first pre-
condition of recognition as sur place refugees because they are
outside Vietnam, their country of nationality. If the nationality of an
applicant cannot be clearly established then the country of the appli-
cant's former habitual residence will be considered.1 23 This is im-
portant because the protections provided by international refugee
law do not extend within the boundaries of an applicant's country of
nationality. 124
B. Requirement That Applicant Has a Well-Founded Fear of Persecution
if Returned to Vietnam
Asylum applicants seeking sur place refugee status must also
demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution that exists as a re-
sult of one or more of the five categories laid out in the 1951 Con-
vention and 1967 Protocol: race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, or membership in a particular social group.' 25 According
to the U.N. Handbook, a well-founded fear has both a subjective and
an objective element. 126 The subjective element arises from the
word "fear," which implicates "a state of mind and a subjective con-
dition." 127 The objective element is denoted by the term "well-
founded," which indicates that the subjective fear must both be sup-
ported by an "objective situation"' 28 and also be "reasonable."' 129
123. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 89.
124. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 88 (requiring that applicant be outside coun-
try of origin to qualify as refugee and mandating that there be no exceptions to rule).
125. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 65(3)(a) (providing general analysis of five
categories and noting ways in which categories factor into determination of well-founded fear
of persecution).
126. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 38 (discussing elements to be considered in
determining well-founded fear of persecution); see also STENBERG, supra note 6, at 63 (explain-
ing that subjective element refers to applicant's state of mind, while objective element re-
quires fear of persecution not be product of "free fantasy or after-construction").
127. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, paras. 37-38 (explaining that determination of ref-
ugee status should focus primarily on statements of particular applicant and not on objective
judgments about conditions in country of origin).
128. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 38 (requiring that asylum seeker's fears of
persecution be based on objective situation and not on imagined events or circumstances).
129. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 41 (explaining that due to importance placed
on subjective element of well-founded fear and because fear must be reasonable, assessment
of credibility is crucial where facts are not clear from record).
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Thus, a Vietnamese asylum seeker must demonstrate a subjective
fear of persecution if he or she is returned to Vietnam, and the fear
must be both based on one of the reasons outlined under interna-
tional law and reasonable under the circumstances. Two of the
grounds set forth in the 1951 Convention for establishing a well-
founded fear of persecution are particularly relevant to individuals
and subgroups of asylum seekers requesting recognition as surplace
refugees. These grounds are fear of persecution based on member-
ship in a particular social group and fear of persecution based on
one's political opinion. 130
1. Membership in a particular social group as basis for well-founded fear
of persecution
The U.N. Handbook notes that particular social groups are usually
comprised of persons with similar backgrounds, habits, or social sta-
tus.1 3' Generally speaking, upon departure from Vietnam, asylum
seekers in essence define themselves and are defined as a social
group. Their group consists of boat people: people who illegally
abandon Vietnam in search of a new life in the West.1 32 More im-
portantly for purposes of recognition as surplace refugees, however,
are the smaller identifiable subgroups that exist within the larger
social group of Vietnamese asylum seekers. For example, a sub-
group might include "double-backers," persons who fled to Hong
Kong, voluntarily returned to Vietnam, and then fled to Hong Kong
again.' 3 3 This subgroup encompasses persons who have twice re-
130. See 1951 Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(2), 189 U.N.T.S. at 152 (listing situations in
which refugee status may be granted).
131. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 77 (noting that persecution based on mem-
bership in particular social group frequently overlaps with persecution based on other
grounds such as race, religion, or nationality).
132. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (describing illegal departures from Viet-
nam by asylum seekers escaping by boat); see also Courtney, supra note 28, at Al (describing
Hong Kong detainees as comprising part of nearly one million persons fleeing Vietnam in
past 15 years, often risking their lives in small boats, and explaining asylum seeker's desire to
obtain freedom and opportunity in America); Stewart, supra note 37, at 26 (quoting senior
British diplomat describing Vietnamese asylum seekers as "boat people" who are chasing
non-existent and unfulfillable dream); Still They Come, supra note 34, at 36 (reporting that asy-
lum seekers traveling by boat from Vietnam continue to seek temporary refuge in Hong Kong
before being resettled in United States, Australia, and other Western countries); Jon Swain,
Boat People Go Out Kicking and Screaming, SUNDAY TIMEs (London), Nov. 10, 1991, at 30
(describing forced repatriation of boat people as "pitiful end to their dream of a better life in
the West").
133. See Callo, supra note 54 (citing agreement between United Kingdom and Vietnam to
repatriate 222 double-backers who had twice made trip to Hong Kong and quoting
Vietnamese officials as saying double-backers travel to Hong Kong second time just to collect
money from United Nations); see also Basler, supra note 53, at 4 (observing that first group to
be forcibly repatriated to Vietnam since 1989 were 59 double-backers); Swain, supra note 132,
at 30 (describing forced return to Vietnam of 20 men, 16 women, and 23 children who were
double-backers). The characterization of double-backers as merely desiring a second repatri-
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jected Vietnamese society and illegally departed from Vietnam.1 34
Groups labeled by Hong Kong authorities as "troublemakers" and
"ringleaders" make up other subgroups.13 5 Asylum seekers who
have publicized their cases through international organizations such
as Amnesty International and Asia Watch form an additional sub-
group, 3 6 as do those who organize and participate in the numerous
demonstrations, fasts, and protests publicized in the international
media. i3 7 Another subgroup is composed of asylum seekers who
attempt legal action, as did nine asylum applicants who appealed
their status determination to Hong Kong authorities in an interna-
tionally publicized case.138 Another subgroup might consist of
asylum seekers who act as political and religious leaders in the de-
tention camps of Hong Kong.13 9 Asylum seekers in each of these
circumstances constitute a separate subgroup within the larger cate-
gory of Vietnamese asylum seekers. Persons within these subgroups
often have particularly compelling bases, because of their high
profiles, to support the finding of a well-founded fear of persecution
if they are forcibly returned to Vietnam.1 40
ation allowance is contested by both the UNHCR and the double-backers themselves. See
Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 23 (asserting that double-backers appear to leave Vietnam
second time for wide variety of reasons).
134. See supra notes 54, 55 and accompanying text (discussing asylum seekers known as
"double-backers").
135. See DILLER, supra note 38, at 44 (describing transfer of 100 boat people identified by
detention center staff as ringleaders and troublemakers to Lai Chi Kok Prison in Kowloon
after dispute between boat people and officials regarding food distribution).
136. See generally Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 8, 12-13, 16-17 & n.42 (discussing
cases of Do Giao, Nguyen Quang Phuc, Toan, Dao Vu Nguyen and his sister and two broth-
ers, and Re Pham Van Ngo).
137. See Christine Courtney, Desperation Grows Among Vietnamese Boat People, VANCOUVER
SUN, Nov. 9, 1991, at A20 [hereinafter Courtney, Desperation Grows] (reporting demonstrations
of Vietnamese in wake of forced repatriations); Courtney, supra note 28, at Al (describing
frequent protests against forced repatriation in which asylum seekers claim that they would
rather commit suicide than live under communism).
138. See Barbara Basler, Hong Kong Agrees to Screen 8 Boat People Again, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,
1991, at I 1 (explaining "landmark" challenge to refugee screening process brought by eight
Vietnamese boat people and noting that eight were among nine cases prepared by human
rights lawyers); Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 8 (discussing case of Do Giao, one of nine
Vietnamese plaintiffs who gained international recognition by challenging procedures fol-
lowed by Hong Kong in determining asylum seekers' status); Chris Peterson, Hong Kong Gov-
ernment to Review Boat People Test Case, Reuter Libr. Rep., Mar. 27, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Wires File (discussing test case of eight Vietnamese boat people and noting
that they will be able to introduce new evidence to support claim that they fled Vietnam to
escape persecution); Ann Scott Tyson, Vietnam Refugee Wins Case Against Repatriation, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Mar. 4, 1991, at 6 (reporting victory of Do Giao in decision allowing him to be
rescreened after mistake by immigration officer).
139. See generally Dan Thomas, Vietnamese Boat People Leaders Make Emotional Appeal to U.S.,
Reuter Libr. Rep., Oct. 30, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (depicting role
of camp leaders in seeking support from Bush administration in struggle to stop
deportations).
140. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 19 (explaining that publicity may endanger
asylum seekers when they return to Vietnam); see also infra notes 144-47 and accompanying
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a. Subjective fear of persecution among asylum seekers based on
membership in a particular subgroup
Commonly, Vietnamese asylum seekers fear that abandoning
Vietnam brands them as unpatriotic or suspect.' 4 1 As a result, they
are afraid that if returned to Vietnam, they will suffer discrimination
and harassment from the Vietnamese Government as well as from
the society at large. 142 Such subjective fears of persecution are es-
pecially compelling in the case of asylum seekers who are members
of subgroups that are outspoken regarding their opposition to the
Government in Vietnam or are members of subgroups that Vietnam
considers inherently suspect.143
The credibility of such fears is implicitly recognized by Hong
Kong authorities and is reflected in their policies. For example, the
staff at the Lo Wu detention center in Hong Kong, the only center
open to reporters, forbids reporters to identify asylum seekers in the
press because it is feared that persons quoted or photographed will
be persecuted if returned to Vietnam.144 According to Stephen Ho,
acting superintendent at Lo Wu, anonymity is important because
known asylum seekers may face severe persecution when they return
to Vietnam.145 In justifying closing other camps to reporters, Hong
Kong officials explain that lawyers advised denying the press access
to detainees as a precaution against political persecution of persons
returned to Vietnam. 146 Such policies constitute a recognition by
text (analyzing policies of Hong Kong authorities that suggest publicity may create danger for
asylum seekers).
141. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 21 (explaining that Vietnamese asylum seekers
in Hong Kong fear stigma of being labeled unpatriotic and are afraid that stigma could also
attach to their children).
142. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 21 (discussing existence of extensive
Vietnamese surveillance bureaucracy and institutionalized discrimination directed at those
whose loyalty is suspect, and describing incarceration in re-education camps of hundreds of
thousands of people associated with military and Government of South Vietnam after unifica-
tion of Vietnam in 1975).
143. An inherently suspect subgroup might include writers, editors, and publishers of a
Hong Kong camp publication that is critical or oppossed to the policies of the Vietnamese
Government. See Refugees at Risk, supra note 53, at 4 (discussing Vietnamese overseas publica-
tions "Viet Nam Hai Ngoai" and "Lang Van" and noting that authors of articles in these
publications are in danger if returned to Vietnam).
144. See Courtney, supra note 28, at Al (observing that while Hanoi publicly agreed not to
persecute returnees, staff members at Lo Wu nevertheless explain that identifying asylum
seekers quoted by press is not allowed because of risk of governmental persecution upon
return to Vietnam).
145. See Courtney, supra note 28, at Al (citing detention center staff's reasons for closing
detention centers to reporters).
146. See Courtney, supra note 28, at Al (reporting that while Hong Kong officials claim
advice of lawyers is reason for denying press access to camps, Rita Fan, member of Hong
Kong's legislature, argues that "real reason" for media restrictions is high volatility of deten-
tion centers and fact that Government, under pressure to maintain control, fears admission of
reporters would exacerbate situation).
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Hong Kong authorities that it is reasonable for asylum seekers, if
identified, to have subjective fears concerning persecution if they
are forced to return to Vietnam. 14
7
The plausibility of a subjective fear of persecution is further sup-
ported by the testimony of refugees resettled in the United States.
For example, resettled refugees state that forcibly sending
Vietnamese asylum seekers back to Vietnam is the equivalent of de-
livering them to a jail where they will be relegated to second-class
citizenship and discriminated against in school, the workplace, and
society at large.1 48 Such testimony, echoed throughout the
Vietnamese community, gives credence to the claims of asylum
seekers, particularly those who are members of identifiable sub-
groups, that they fear the consequences of forced repatriation to
Vietnam.
Three Vietnamese camp leaders in Hong Kong summed up the
subjective fears of many asylum seekers in an interview via secret
telephone with Reuters reporters.' 49 Having repeatedly stated that
camp residents would prefer death to forcible return to Vietnam,
the leaders proclaimed:
[W]e were really persecuted by the Vietnamese government so we
dare not go back and we believe the international community real-
izes this ... we strongly believe that if we go back again we will be
persecuted again as we were before... we fear that nobody from
the international community or UNHCR can have access, condi-
tions or enough staff to monitor or observe what is happening to
us (if we are sent back).' 50
And in the words of a Vietnamese woman about to be returned to
Vietnam, "'I will never be free, I am going back to Vietnam ....
Nobody knows what will happen to us. And can anyone really help
147. See Courtney, Desperation Grows, supra note 137, at A20 (stating that since announce-
ment of forced-repatriation agreement, Hong Kong has prevented media from visiting camps
whose residents may be sent back to Vietnam); Courtney, supra note 28, at Al (explaining that
Hong Kong Government blocked access of media to detainees out of fear that publicized
detainees may face persecution if returned to Vietnam).
148. See Thuan Le, Vietnamese Fasters Protesting Refugees' Plight in Hong Kong, L.A. TIMES
(Orange County edition), Dec. 21, 1991, at B I (quoting Vietnamese activists in United States
who claim that asylum seekers returned to Vietnam will face discrimination in work and edu-
cation). Chuyen Nguyen, general secretary of the Vietnamese Community of Southern Cali-
fornia, further argues that the problem of refugees should be solved inside Vietnam and not
by making those refugees who have already left return to Vietnam. Id.
149. See Thomas, supra note 139 (recounting interview between Reuters reporters and
three leaders at Whitehead Detention Centre in Hong Kong regarding asylum seekers' con-
cerns over agreement between United Kingdom and Vietnam in which Vietnam agreed to take
back boat people denied refugee status).
150. Thomas, supra note 139. The article also noted that the refugees were depending on
George Bush and his administration to stop their repatriation to Vietnam. Id.
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us once we're back home?' "151 These expressions of fear by asylum
seekers themselves, together with existing policies and attitudes of
Hong Kong authorities and resettled Vietnamese refugees, indicate
that asylum seekers' claims that they fear return to Vietnam are
credible. Further, such claims of fear of persecution are particularly
compelling when made by members of subgroups within the larger
group of asylum seekers who are outspoken regarding their opposi-
tion to the Vietnamese Government or groups that the Vietnamese
Government is likely to consider inherently suspect.
b. The political atmosphere in Vietnam supports objective element of
well-founded fear based on membership in a particular
subgroup
Objective circumstances in Vietnamese society support asylum
seekers' subjective fear of persecution based on their membership in
particular subgroups of asylum seekers. Generally speaking, asylum
seekers forced to return to Vietnam face persecution related to
crimes delineated in Vietnam's Criminal Code, which became effec-
tive in June 1985.152 Under the heading "Crimes Against National
Security," it is a crime punishable by up to two years in prison to
illegally flee or attempt to flee the country.' 5 3 According to Am-
nesty International, many people are jailed in Vietnam for trying to
leave the country without permission.15 4 Since 1989, efforts by the
Vietnamese Government to stop unauthorized departures have in-
tensified, resulting in shootings, executions, convictions, and im-
prisonments of Vietnamese citizens. 155 During the period between
151. Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 20-21.
152. See generally CRIMINAL CODE, arts. 72-83 (Nat'l Technical Info. Serv. JPRS-SEA-85-
135, 1985) (Vietnam) [hereinafter CRIMINAL CODE] (including, for example, crimes of fleeing
to foreign country, organizing, forcing, or inciting attempted flight to foreign country, oppos-
ing or organizing to overthrow socialist state, spreading anti-socialist propaganda, or under-
mining policy of unity, and providing that these laws apply to acts committed by Vietnamese
citizens outside, as well as inside, Vietnam).
153. Id. art. 89, at 32.
154. See VIETNAM: "RENOVATION," supra note 82, at 42 (discussing cases of three people
arrested for attempting to leave Vietnam and noting that whereabouts of forty others, major-
ity of whom were arrested between 1978 and 1983, is unknown); Human Rights in Vietnam,
AMNESTY INT'L NEWS RELEASE, Feb. 21, 1990, at 3 (declaring that people who try to leave
Vietnam may be sentenced to imprisonment or re-education, and that others are held without
trial between six months and two years, and some much longer).
155. See VIETNAM: "RENOVATION," supra note 82, at 42 (referring to recent press reports
indicating escalation of official attempts to end clandestine departures and quoting
Vietnamese official as stating that two persons were executed in first six months of 1989 for
illegal departure attempts); Wolf & Lowman, supra note 85, at A23 (reporting that according
to U.S. State Department, some Vietnamese citizens caught trying to escape Vietnam have
been beaten to death during governmental interrogations, others have been detained in re-
education camps, and others, typically organizers of escape attempts, have been executed or
given lengthy prison sentences); see also Vietnamese Boat People Repatriated from Hong Kong,
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January and June of 1989, Vietnamese officials reported that 413
people were convicted for "illegal departures." 156 Many of these
people received prison sentences of up to twelve years.15 7 Accord-
ing to Trinh Le, the Vietnamese Social Welfare Ministry official in
charge of resettling returnees, persons caught attempting to flee
Vietnam are heavily punished when they are discovered, with many
receiving sentences of up to fifteen years imprisonment. 158 The im-
position of such severe penalties on people who attempt to flee Viet-
nam is an indicator of the Vietnamese Government's sentiment
toward asylum seekers who have successfully fled Vietnam and is
also a signpost cautioning against hastily returning screened-out
asylum seekers.
Advocates of forced repatriation argue that the central govern-
ment of Vietnam has agreed not to persecute or harass persons for-
cibly repatriated to Vietnam, despite their illegal departures from
that nation.1 59 Such assurances, however, offer little consolation to
forced returnees.1 60 While Vietnam has agreed not to prosecute
Xinhua Gen. Overseas News Serv., May 12, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Xinhua
File (quoting Vietnamese officials who emphasized that boat people must be punished for
their attempts to leave their country).
156. VIETNAM: "RENOVATION," supra note 82, at 42.
157. VIETNAM: "RENOVATION," supra note 82, at 42.
158. See William Branigin, Forced Repatriation Sparks New Concerns; Vietnam's Human Rights
Policy at Issue, WASH. PosT, Nov. 10, 1991, at A46 (stating that Trinh Le described treatment of
returning boat people as "lenient" in contrast to Vietnamese Government's punishment of
trip organizers, many of whom have been sentenced to 15 years imprisonment). Vietnamese
citizens who are convicted of organizing illegal departures have been given very severe prison
sentences. See, e.g., Foreign News Briefs, UPI, Dec. 14, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
UPI File (stating that Vietnamese court sentenced former school principal to 16 years in
prison for helping 19 people try to flee Vietnam by boat and indicating that nine accomplices
were also arrested); Indochina, Reuter Libr. Rep., July 19, 1979, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Wires File (reporting life imprisonment of organizer found guilty of helping 231 people
to leave Vietnam); "Life and Death Sentences" to Stop Illegal Emigration, Vietnam News Agency,
Oct. 29, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (asserting that Vietnamese border
patrols have increased and that many organizers and intermediaries of illegal departures have
been punished severely, with some being sentenced to death); Vietnamese Official Gets Life Term,
UPI, Mar. 22, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (describing Vietnamese radio
report that Vietnamese Supreme Court sentenced senior security official to life imprisonment
for arranging three illegal refugee escapes for 260 people; official's aides received sentences
from two to ten years).
159. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 22 (examining agreement between United
Kingdom and Vietnam that includes promise by Vietnamese Government to treat returnees
fairly and without persecution); see also MEMORANDUM, supra note 41, para. 3(a) (stating that
Vietnamese Government's pledge to UNHCR regarding those who return voluntarily includes
"waiver of prosecution and of punitive and discriminatory measures"); cf Charles Wallace,
Hardship Awaits "Boat People" Forced Back to Vietnam, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1990, at A8 (reporting
Vietnamese official's statement that two boat people imprisoned upon repatriation were
prison escapees who asked to be sent back to jail).
160. Moreover, while monitors from UNHCR and voluntary agencies report that Vietnam
has kept its promise for the most part, they also report a pattern of interrogation and low-
level harassment of returnees. Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 22. See also Branigin, supra
note 158, at A46 (quoting executive director of Asia Watch, who expressed concern that har-
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persons residing in Hong Kong for the crime of leaving the country
illegally, the Government has not agreed to repeal the departure law
altogether. 161 Thus, returnees fear they will be branded as persons
who have criminal records regardless of whether they are actually
prosecuted.' 62 Asylum seekers believe this will lead to difficulty in
obtaining employment, education for themselves and their children,
housing, business licensing, and other services necessary for sur-
vival in Vietnamese society.'
63
Similarly, under the Vietnamese Criminal Code, members of cer-
tain subgroups of asylum seekers may be at particular risk of perse-
cution if forced to return to Vietnam. For example, while Vietnam
has extended limited amnesty for the physical act of leaving the
country, it has not extended such a waiver to persons who organize
departures.164 The Code provides a sentence of five to fifteen years
for anyone who organizes an attempt to flee16 5 and from twelve to
twenty years or life in prison in "especially serious" cases. 16 6 Vari-
ous subgroups of asylum seekers currently residing in Hong Kong
have organized the departures of family members, neighbors, and
friends and could face prosecution under the Criminal Code on that
basis. Additionally, it is unclear just how broad an interpretation of
the term "organize" the Vietnamese Government will apply if it
chooses to enforce this law. Such ambiguity in the law, combined
with a lack of clarification by the Vietnamese Government, results in
assment and interrogation faced by voluntary returnees will be worse for those forced to re-
turn to Vietnam).
161. See CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 152, arts. 85(1), 89, at 31, 32 (defining crime of ille-
gaily emigrating to foreign country).
162. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 21 (concluding that problem for returnees is
that Vietnam insists that people have committed crime by leaving country and, even though
they may not face prosecution for this crime, most Vietnamese in Hong Kong believe they will
be treated as if they have criminal records if they return to Vietnam).
163. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 21 (explaining that legal documents of persons
considered unpatriotic may be revoked and that without such documents, it is impossible to
legally reside or travel anywhere in Vietnam, to vote, to register marriages, births, or deaths,
or to obtain employment, education, or public medical care); see also Wolf & Lowman, supra
note 85, at A23 (stating that Vietnamese Government imputes political motive to acts of ille-
gal departure and regards emigres as potential political enemies of state; further noting that
such attitude results in pervasive discrimination in Vietnamese society against asylum
seekers).
164. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 22 (asserting that Vietnam has not extended
waiver to persons who commit offenses other than leaving country illegally); see also DILLER,
supra note 38, at 57 (citing D. Wallen, Hanoi Vows Not to Punish Boat People ho Return, SouTH
CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 11, 1988, at 1) (noting that returnees not considered to have
opposed Government would merely receive warning from Vietnamese officials and conclud-
ing that opponents of Government such as emigration organizers risk greater chance of
prosecution).
165. CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 152, art. 85(2), at 31.
166. CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 152, art. 85(3), at 31. The Criminal Code defines a "seri-
ous crime" as a "crime that causes major harm to society and for which the maximun penalty
is five or more years in prison, life in prison or the death penalty." Id. art. 8(2), at 5.
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a situation in which asylum seekers, comprising the subgroup of
those known to have organized departures, are exposed to signifi-
cant risks of persecution if forcibly returned to Vietnam.
67
The Code also provides for up to twelve years in prison for any-
one who flees to another country and "remains there with the intent
to oppose the People's Government."' 68 Several individuals as well
as subgroups of asylum seekers in Hong Kong have engaged in ac-
tivities clearly in opposition to the Government in Vietnam.169 Be-
cause of such activities these individuals and groups face a
significant possibility of persecution if forcibly returned to Vietnam.
Article 78 of the U.N. Handbook recognizes the possibility that
such persecution may take place. The U.N. Handbook explains that
persecution may be the result of a lack of confidence in a group's
loyalty to its nation,170 noting that such a lack of confidence may
derive from the "political outlook, antecedents or economic activity
of its members."' 71 Generally, asylum seekers, in illegally aban-
167. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 22 & n.55 (citing cases of Vo Minh Suu and Van
Tien Ka, Vietnamese citizens who were jailed after they returned from countries of first asy-
lum as punishment for organizing departures; asserting further that in one case known to Asia
Watch, woman died under torture in prison after she was accused of selling her boat to group
of counterrevolutionaries). Persons accused of political crimes remain vulnerable despite the
Government's limited amnesty for those who simply physically leave the country. See id. at 22
(explaining that political crime laws could be applied to those in detention centers who have
expressed political opposition to Vietnamese Government through essays, artwork, or dem-
onstrations); see, e.g., CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 152, arts. 74, 81, 82, 97, 99, at 28, 30, 34-35
(describing numerous crimes under which returnees could be prosecuted for political "indis-
cretions"). For example, under article 74(c), "supplying information and documents which
are not state secrets so that they can be used by a foreign country against the Socialist Repub-
lic of Vietnam" carries a penalty of 12 years to life in prison or even the death penalty. Id. art.
74(c), at 28. This provision may be applied to asylum seekers who have cooperated with
international human rights groups on topics such as the number and location of re-education
camps and the treatment of prisoners within those camps. For example, Amnesty Interna-
tional reports that it has received information from boat people about the location and organ-
ization of re-education camps, the number of people detained in the camps, and the treatment
of the prisoners. VIETNAM: "RENovATION," supra note 82, at 44. If such information is con-
sidered harmful to Vietnam, those who provided it could be prosecuted under article 81 of
the Vietnamese Criminal Code, which defines the crime of "undermining the policy of unity."
CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 152, art. 81, at 30. Article 82 of the Code outlines the crime of
"anti-socialist propaganda." The article provides from 3 to 12 years in prison to anyone who
"spread[s] propaganda against the socialist system," "spread[s] psychological warfare argu-
ments," or "spread[s] false rumors and causes panic among the people." Id. art. 82, at 30.
Such provisions could easily be applied to prosecute Vietnamese asylum seekers who have
engaged in protests, created signs, resisted repatriation, talked to reporters, or taken other
actions against the Government of Vietnam. Other articles that might provide a basis for
prosecuting asylum seekers upon their return to Vietnam include article 97, "The Crime of
Smuggling or Illegally Transporting Goods or Currency Across the Border," and article 99,
"The Crime of Spreading Decadent Culture." Ide arts. 97, 99, at 34-35.
168. CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 152, art. 85(1), at 31.
169. See supra notes 131-40, infra notes 182-92 and accompanying text (discussing individ-
ual and subgroups of asylum seekers that may be subject to persecution based on circum-
stances arising after their departure from Vietnam).
170. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 78.
171. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 78.
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doning their homeland under extremely dangerous conditions, 72
have made known in no uncertain terms the status of their loyalty to
the Vietnamese Government. 173 More far-reaching and salient,
however, are the words and actions of various subgroups within the
larger community of asylum seekers in Hong Kong that have ex-
pressed a hatred and fear of the Vietnamese Government and a cor-
responding preference for the U.S. Government, a longtime enemy
of Vietnam.1 74 Vietnam is likely to take notice of the words and ac-
tions of such sworn enemies of the Vietnamese State. Conse-
quently, while there is reason to believe that Vietnam will question
the loyalty of all asylum seekers in Hong Kong, of particular concern
are persons within various social and political subgroups of the pop-
ulation of asylum seekers. These subgroups include, for example,
persons who have organized departures of asylum seekers from
Vietnam, groups that have demonstarted a clear lack of loyalty to
the Vietnamese Government, as well as groups of asylum seekers
who remain in Hong Kong camps with the intent to oppose the
"People's Government." Persons within such subgroups face a par-
ticularly grave risk of persecution if forced to return to Vietnam. It
is thus imperative that Hong Kong fully consider applications by
members of such subgroups for recognition as sur place refugees.
2. Political opinions expressed by individuals and members of certain
subgroups as basis for well-founded fear of persecution ifforcibly
returned to Vietnam
A second basis for granting surplace refugee status to Vietnamese
asylum seekers who may initially have been screened out as eco-
nomic migrants is a well-founded fear of persecution based on polit-
ical opinion.17 5 To claim a well-founded fear on the basis of
political opinion, an asylum seeker must show (1) that he or she has
a subjective fear of persecution for holding an opinion; (2) that the
172. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text (discussing dangers of seeking asylum
by boat in South China Sea).
173. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 23 (observing that Vietnamese Government
tries to prevent departures by depicting those who leave as unpatriotic).
174. See Courtney, Desperation Grows, supra note 137, at A20 (stating that asylum seekers
have staged numerous protests proclaiming that they would rather commit suicide than live
under communism, and quoting asylum seekers' note from Whitehead camp declaring "you
are pushing our fates into the dead end of communist prisons .... We bring to the American
Congress a message of blood and tears with cries for urgent help from people who thirst for
freedom like we thirst for sunshine. Save us."); Thomas, supra note 139 (quoting Vietnamese
camp leaders who look for support from United States because it is "generous, reasonable,
and anti-communist" country).
175. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 80(f) (concluding that having political opin-
ions that differ from those of government, alone, is not sufficient ground to claim refugee
status; applicant must show fear of persecution because of those opinions).
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opinion has come to the attention of the authorities or is attributed
by the authorities to the applicant; and (3) that the opinion is not
tolerated by authorities from the applicant's country of origin. 176
Moreover, all factors that indicate that fear is the predominant mo-
tive behind an applicant's claim for asylum must be considered.
177
Pertinent factors include personal and family background, member-
ship in particular racial, religious, cultural, social, or political
groups, the personal interpretation of the situation by the applicant,
and the applicant's personal experiences.'
78
a. The political opinions of individuals and subgroups of asylum
seekers as basis of claim of a subjective fear of persecution if
forced to return to Vietnam
The U.N. Handbook notes that the evaluation of an applicant's sub-
jective fear cannot be separated from consideration of the personal-
ity of the applicant, because psychological reactions differ among
individuals in identical situations.' 79 While one person may possess
political opinions that would make life in the person's homeland in-
tolerable, another may hold less adamant convictions.180 As is read-
ily apparent, many asylum applicants in Hong Kong, although
initially screened out as economic migrants, possess a genuine sub-
jective fear of persecution if returned to Vietnam because of the
political opinions they have expressed during their absence from
Vietnam.
As outlined above, to qualify for sur place refugee status on the
basis of one's political opinion, the political opinion held by an ap-
plicant must come to the attention of the authorities in some fashion
or be attributed by the authorities to the applicant.' 8 ' Generally,
the political opinions of asylum seekers with regard to the
Vietnamese Government are Well known. For example, written criti-
cisms of the Government are persuasive throughout camps of first
asylum in Southeast Asia. Many camps display signs painted in
large red letters that declare: "After 15 Years in the Shackles of
176. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 80(0. The "relative importance" or "tenacity"
of the applicant's opinions, as determined by all the circumstances in the case, is also perti-
nent to the determination of refugee status. lI-
177. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 41.
178. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 41.
179. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 40.
180. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 40 (noting that individual personalities may
affect psychological reactions).
181. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 80(f). The degree of the applicant's public expo-
sure may be relevant to a determination of refugee status. For example, a writer or a teacher
occupying a prominent public position may receive more public exposure for his or her polit-
ical opinions than persons whose jobs do not require frequent contact with the public. Id.
19931 463
464 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:433
Communist Regime, We Have Found Freedom in PFAC, [Philip-
pines First Asylum Camp]; Please Do Not Let Us Despair" and "Do
Not Abandon Us the POW from South Vietnam."' 82
Additionally, articles in the international press, as well as publica-
tions, photographs, poems, and artwork by individuals and sub-
groups of asylum seekers, reflect political views often critical of the
Vietnamese Government.183 For example, the University of Califor-
nia at Irvine displayed thirty paintings created by asylum seekers at
Hong Kong's Whitehead Detention Centre. 8 4 The artwork de-
picted the risks and suffering that boat people endure in seeking
freedom. 8 5 Another exhibit of Vietnamese asylum seekers' paint-
ings toured various cities in both the United States and Europe. 86
Much of the artwork reflects the oppressive conditions that asylum
seekers are willing to endure in order to escape Vietnam and find
freedom.' 8 7 Because each painting was accompanied by the name
of the artist and a short biography, it is very likely that Vietnamese
officials are aware of those persons responsible for the artwork.' 88
Another example of a subgroup of asylum seekers in Hong Kong
that has expressed political opinions and thus is likely to come to
the attention of the Vietnamese Government includes thirty-nine
asylum seekers that sent a letter to the United States containing a
declaration of the organization they had formed, a plan of action
they would follow if forcibly returned to Vietnam, their names,
182. Taken from photographs by author during trip to camps in countries of first asylum
in Southeast Asia (1989-1990). Other signs displayed by interned Vietnamese asylum seekers
read: "Seeking Freedom Through Dangers and Death, We Are Proud To Get Much Humani-
tarian Help from the Free World," "I Would Rather Die Than Return to Vietnam," "The Free
World Countries Please Come to Our Rescue," "After the Hell of Communism, The Philip-
pines Is Heaven," "Please Don't Abandon Us and the Children of the Ex-Soldiers Who Had
Been Fighting for Freedom." Id.
183. See INDOCHINA RESOURCE ACTION CTR., STILL LIVES: ART BY VIETNAMESE BOAT PEO-
PLE IN HONG KONG 3-12 (1991) [hereinafter STILL LIVES] (depicting political artwork created
by Vietnamese asylum seekers in show touring United States); Barbara Basler, Vietnamese Resist
Repatriation Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1991, at 4 (explaining that while reporters are not
allowed inside most detention camps, they can often get close enough to witness political
demonstrations and read political protest signs displayed by internees); Kristina Lindgren,
Vietnamese Internee Art on Display, L.A. TIMES (Orange County edition), Oct. 31, 1991, at B3
(describing exhibit of paintings by Vietnamese nationals interned at Whitehead Detention
Centre in Hong Kong as portraying terrible conditions of life in camp).
184. Lindgren, supra note 183, at B3.
185. Lindgren, supra note 183, at B3 (reporting commments of Anh Hong Do, member of
Project Ngoc, University of California Irvine student group that sponsored exhibit).
186. See STILL LIVES, supra note 183, at 2 (indicating that exhibit toured cities including
San Francisco, Washington, D.C., Minneapolis, St. Paul, Chicago, New York, London, and
Paris).
187. See STILL LIVEs, supra note 183, at 5-10 (presenting pictures from boats and detention
centers of crying children and people sleeping on floors and in crowded, cramped cubicles).
Several of the artists stated that they sought artistic freedom in leaving Vietnam and that they
had been persecuted in Vietnam. Id. at 9.
188. STILL LIVEs, supra note 183, at 5-10.
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camp identity numbers, and a photograph of the group taken during
a ceremony commemorating the founding of the group.18 9 After
reaching the United States, the letter was returned "address un-
known" to Vietnam rather than to Hong Kong. 190 Subsequently,
the letter was forwarded from Vietnam to Hong Kong without its
accompanying documents, indicating that Vietnamese authorities
had intercepted its contents.' 9 ' According to Asia Watch, other
subgroups of asylum seekers who face risk of persecution based on
political opinion if forcibly returned to Vietnam include persons
whose claims of persecution at the hands of the Vietnamese Govern-
ment are extensively publicized, organizers of the demonstrations
against forced repatriation, publishers, editors, writers, and artists
who have published their works in Hong Kong or abroad that ex-
press, explicitly or implicitly, criticism of the Vietnamese
Government. 9
2
The Vietnamese Government, for its part, has actively sought in-
formation about the kinds of activities and opinions held by individ-
uals and subgroups carried on in first asylum camps. According to
Asia Watch, the Vietnamese Government has conducted extensive
interrogations of some asylum seekers upon their return to Viet-
nam, in order to obtain information about organized groups within
the camps.' 93 Questions asked during interrogations include in-
quiries related to camp organizations and "troublemakers."'' 9 4 In
one instance, the Government confiscated photographs that a wo-
man had taken in the Hong Kong camps,' 9 5 and the photographs
later reappeared when officials interrogated the woman and asked
her to identify each person in the pictures. 19 6 Other returnees are
189. See Refugees at Risk, supra note 53, at 3 (citing Jonathan Braude, U.S. Postmen Put Rebel
Viets'Lists at Risk, SouTH CHINA MORNING PosT, Feb. 2, 1992) (describing this case as example
of situation where Vietnamese asylum seekers may be imperiled due to their opposition to
Vietnamese Government).
190. Refugees at Risk, supra note 53, at 3.
191. Refugees at Risk, supra note 53, at 3. Where, as in this case, the Vietnamese Govern-
ment is likely to have information regarding asylum seekers, paragraph 96 of the U.N. Hand-
book requires that "[r]egard should be had in particular to whether such actions may have
come to the notice of the authorities of the person's country of origin and how they are likely
to be viewed by those authorities .... Id.
192. Refugees at Risk, supra note 53, at 3 (noting that Vietnam closely monitors Vietnamese
overseas press).
193. Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 23.
194. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 23 (asserting that interrogations conducted by
Vietnamese officials of ex-residents of detention camps included questions seeking identifica-
tion of camp organizations and names of "troublemakers," guards, voluntary agency staff, and
visiting clergy).
195. Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 23.
196. Id. Particularly at risk in these interrogations are the double-backers. See id. (quoting
provincial official in Haiphong as saying, "These people [double-backers] must be punished
for leaving a second time.").
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asked to identify the origins of any literature they bring back to Viet-
nam and to reveal the identity of asylum seekers who work with for-
eigners or volunteer agencies.
1 97
b. Political conditions in Vietnam supporting objective element of well-
founded fear based on political opinion
For an asylum applicant's fear of persecution to be deemed "well
founded" under international law, the opinions held by the appli-
cant must not be tolerated by the authorities in the applicant's coun-
try of origin. 198 This determination requires an examination of
conditions within the country of origin. 99 According to Amnesty
International, Vietnam continues to persecute persons who oppose
or are suspected of opposing the Government and its policies.
200
Indeed, since 1975, Vietnam has been one of the most repressive
countries in the world. 20' The position of the U.S. Government re-
garding forced repatriation is that "political conditions in Vietnam
are so repressive that it would be unjust at this point to send anyone
back against his or her will."'20 2 The use by Vietnam of re-education
camps is illustrative of the repression of political dissent and the
free exchange of ideas. For example, although Vietnam has done
away with Resolution 49/NQ/TVQH,20 3 which had provided for de-
tention without trial or charge and sentencing to re-education
camps to punish persons expressing opinions critical of the Govern-
ment, the Government continues to confine persons without trial on
197. Refugees at Risk, supra note 53, at 3.
198. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 42 (mandating that inquiry into whether fear
is well founded requires determination of whether sufficient facts exist "to permit the finding
that the applicant would face a serious possibility of persecution" based on political beliefs if
returned to his or her country of origin) (emphasis added).
199. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 42 (stating that knowledge of conditions in
applicant's country of origin, although not primary objective, is important element in assess-
ing applicant's credibility).
200. See VIETNAM: "RENovATION," supra note 82, at 35 (indicating that some persons held
in Vietnamese prisons and re-education camps are prisoners of conscience, detained simply
for peaceful expression of their political, religious, or other beliefs).
20 1. See Vietnamese Boat People: Hearing of the Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcomm. of the House
Foreign Affairs Comm., 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991) (forthcoming, availabh' in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Federal News Service File, at *18) (testimony of Rep. Dornan). Representative
Dornan stated:
I have said quite often that Vietnamese (sic) is probably the most repressive country
in the world right now, more so than Cuba, more so in some ways even than China-
because of the economic collapse; there's still religious persecution; there's as many
or more political prisoners pro-rating the population than there is in China with one
billion, two hundred and fifty, sixty million people ....
Id
202. Id. (testimony of Rep. Solarz) (explaining that reports state that people in Hong
Kong camps are contemplating mass suicide if forced to return to Vietnam).
203. See CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 152, at I (stating that new criminal code incorporates
all previous criminal laws in Vietnam and leaves out any part of 49/NQyTVQH).
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a daily basis. 20 4 Those confined to re-education camps include writ-
ers, artists, religious persons, and others who are suspected of being
critics of government policy. 205 Because of the lack of information
available from Vietnam, it is unclear how many people suspected of
antigovernment activities are being held without charge or trial in
re-education camps. 206 There is, however, at least one central re-
education camp in each of Vietnam's forty provinces. 20 7 These
main camps are divided into several subcamps, each reportedly
holding up to one thousand prisoners. 20 8
Vietnam also makes efforts through intelligence gathering net-
works to identify persons critical of official government policies and
ideology.20 9 Once identified, suspect persons are re-educated in
camps throughout Vietnam. 210 Many "criminals" are held in jail-
like conditions. 2 11 They are provided meager rations, forced to
work long hours, and made to attend political indoctrination meet-
ings.212 In 1986, Vietnam adopted a policy of doi moi, or "renova-
tion," that called for various legal, economic, and social reforms. 21 3
Pursuant to this policy, the Government granted amnesty to
204. See, e.g., VIETNAM: "RENOVATION," supra note 82, at 35 (citing State Committee, Na-
tional Assembly Resolution, No. 49/NQ./TVQH, June 21, 1961) (reporting that Vietnam has
caused substantial numbers of people who were not connected with war or previous policies
of South Vietnamese Government to be held in re-education camps); see also id. at 36 (explain-
ing that even those who are charged are convicted at trials which fall short of international
standards of fairness).
205. See VIETNAM: "RENOVATION," supra note 82, at 35 (stating that decisions as to who
will be confined are usually made by local "People's Committees," which imprison those con-
sidered to be threat to national security).
206. See VIETNAM: "RENOVATION," supra note 82, at 35 (reporting that Vietnamese Gov-
ernment claims that not more than 130 civilian and military persons from South Vietnam are
still held in re-education camps).
207. VIETNAM: "RENOVATION," supra note 82, at 44.
208. VIETNAM: "RENOVATION," supra note 82, at 44.
209. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 21 (discussing Vietnam's surveillance bureau-
cracy, designed to collect information on those whose loyalty is suspect); see also infra notes
210-12 and accompanying text (discussing interrogation of asylum seekers upon return to
Vietnam); see also Vietnam: Repression of Dissent, AsIA WATCH, Mar. 4, 1991, at 2 [hereinafter
Repression of Dissent] (observing that Vietnamese National Assembly provided for repression of
those who try to undermine political stability, including those who incite people and rally
them to oppose policies of government).
210. See Repression of Dissent, supra note 209, at 1 (stating that government critics are ar-
rested without charge and placed in camps where inmates perform hard labor and are
malnourished, abused, and deprived of medical care).
211. See, e.g., VIETNAM: "RENOVATION," supra note 82, at 44-45 (describing prison living
quarters as large concrete barracks with corrugated iron roofs and noting that compulsory
labor is reputed to be part of regimen of all re-education camps).
212. See Repression of Dissent, supra note 209, at 1 (indicating that government critics are
also punished through revocation of their identification documents, which allow citizens to
work, travel, and enjoy public services including education and medical care).
213. See Repression of Dissent, supra note 209, at 2 (discussing Vietnam's new policy endors-
ing (1) gradual reform of economy to favor free market economic theory; (2) amnesty for
thousands in re-education camps; (3) promulgation of criminal procedure code; and (4) lim-
ited allowance of social criticism).
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thousands of ideological prisoners and released them from re-edu-
cation camps. 214 In 1989, however, the Government again tight-
ened controls apparently because of nervousness about the reforms
taking place in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 21 5 This trend
culminated in "Decision 135," handed down by the Council of Min-
isters in December 1989.216 The decision, adopted by the National
Assembly, mandated a renewed effort to stifle crime, corruption,
and persons who seek to undermine the party and state.21 7 These
examples illustrate that Vietnam continues to systematically perse-
cute persons who hold viewpoints contrary to those of the
Vietnamese Government.
An additional indicia of Vietnam's intolerance for contrary polit-
ical opinion is apparent in the Vietnamese Criminal Code. The
Government has not extended any waiver of prosecution or punish-
ment with regard to asylum seekers for political crimes enumerated
in the Criminal Code.218 For example, the Code contains vaguely
defined crimes including "spreading propaganda against the social-
ist system," "spreading false rumors and causing panic among the
people," and "making, storing or circulating anti-socialist docu-
ments or cultural products." 21 9 Such crimes could easily be used to
prosecute individuals as well as members of numerous subgroups of
asylum seekers for a myriad of activities that occur on a daily basis in
the detention camps of Hong Kong.220 This is particularly true re-
garding persons who have assumed leadership roles in the
camps. 22' Thus the existence of a re-education system in Vietnam
214. See VIETNAM: "RENOVATION," supra note 82, at 35 (noting that according to
Vietnamese governmental announcements, 8300 prisoners were released under 1987 and
1988 amnesties as result of implementation of doi moi program).
215. See Repression of Dissent, supra note 209, at 2 (stating that in 1989, Party Secretary
General Nguyen Van Linh, who in 1987 had urged that social ills be exposed and publicized
in media, called on newspaper editors to soften their criticism of Government); see also id.
(reporting that during 1989, Vietnamese Government was involved in thousands of arrests of
suspects, surrenders of criminals during Decision 135 crime drive, and seizures of contraband
literature).
216. See Repression of Dissent, supra note 209, at 2 (noting that decision was widely
publicized).
217. See Repression of Dissent, supra note 209, at 2 (citing Vietnamese editorial explaining
that Decision 135 set precedent for number of future anti-crime campaigns).
218. Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 22.
219. CRIMINAL CooE, supra note 152, art. 82, at 30.
220. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 22 (stating that such laws could be applied to
hundreds of Vietnamese asylum seekers who have, through demonstrations, artwork, and es-
says, expressed their opposition to Vietnamese Government); Refugees at Risk, supra note 53, at
4 (stating that on May 15, 1992, Doan Thank Liem, Vietnamese lawyer, arrested on account of
his association with American businessman Mike Morrow, was sentenced to 12 years impris-
onment for spreading "anti-socialist propaganda").
221. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 23 (explaining that Vietnamese authorities have
interrogated returnees in specific attempt to identify camp organizers and troublemakers
among asylum seekers in Hong Kong).
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designed to stifle and punish all forms of political dissent together
with vaguely defined laws criminalizing contrary political viewpoints
provides objective support for claims by individuals or members of
certain subgroups of asylum seekers that they fear persecution if
forced to return to Vietnam because of activities and political opin-
ions expressed while absent from Vietnam.
C. Applicant Is Unable or Unwilling To Return to Country of Origin
The final element necessary for recognition as a refugee based on
one's social group or political opinion requires that an applicant be
unable or unwilling to return to his or her homeland on account of a
well-founded fear of persecution. 222 Vietnamese asylum seekers in
Hong Kong are clearly unable or unwilling to return to their home-
land, as evidenced by their numerous applications for political asy-
lum and appeals when such applications are denied, threats of
suicide if forced to return to Vietnam, and rejection of opportunities
to voluntarily repatriate to Vietnam. 223 As discussed above, many
boat people who may have originally left Vietnam for economic rea-
sons may satisfy the subjective and objective elements necessary to
establish a well-founded fear of persecution should they be returned
to Vietnam. 224 Because such fears may arise as a consequence of
membership in particular subgroups or expressions of political
opinions by individuals or subgroups and because such persons are
unwilling to return to Vietnam on account of their fear, claims of sur
place refugee status must be fully considered by Hong Kong.
D. Problems Inherent in Monitoring Forced Returnees in Vietnam Require
That Hong Kong Thoroughly Consider Claims for Sur Place
Refugee Status
Hong Kong should adopt a liberal policy of recognizing sur place
refugee claims in light of the colony's inability to effectively and ac-
222. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 34.
223. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (expressing fear of Vietnamese asylum
seekers that, if forcibly repatriated to Vietnam, they are likely to encounter discrimination
from Government and entire society in Vietnam); supra note 152 and accompanying text (indi-
cating that asylum seekers may face criminal prosecution upon return to Vietnam); supra notes
183-91 (reporting attempts by Vietnamese to qualify for political asylum); supra notes 150-51
(noting unwillingness of asylum seekers to return to Vietnam and stating that many would
rather die than be forced to return).
224. See supra notes 141-42, 148 and accompanying text (arguing that because boat peo-
ple fear unfair treatment by Vietnamese Government and society upon return to Vietnam,
they satisfy subjective element necessary to establish well-founded fear of persecution); supra
notes 152-66 and accompanying text (contending that criminal prosecution that boat people
may face upon forced return to Vietnam supports objective element necessary to establish
well-founded fear of persecution).
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curately monitor the plight of forced returnees to Vietnam. Propo-
nents of forced repatriation, including Hong Kong, argue that after
monitoring voluntary returnees in Vietnam, they have found that
the boat people were not badly treated upon their return. 225 Asia
Watch, however, reports that "a disturbing pattern of interrogation
and low-level harassment of voluntary returnees has emerged."
226
Such harassment has included making returnees report to the local
police station, sometimes as often as weekly.227 Asia Watch noted
that such reporting is typically required of persons recently released
from prison or under house arrest.2 28 Additionally, according to
one Vietnamese source who met several double-backers returned
under the voluntary repatriation program, returnees are followed by
Vietnamese officials on a regular basis and are denied documents
necessary to function in Vietnamese society.229 Forced returnees,
particularly individuals and members of subgroups who have ex-
pressed opinion criticizing Vietnam during their stay in Hong Kong
camps, are likely to face even greater risks of such persecution.
230
Further, because of the nature of the monitoring program, the
reliability of United Nations and United Kingdom reports that no
persecution of returnees has taken place is questionable. 23' Outside
contacts with returnees are commonly arranged through govern-
225. See At the Heart of Vietnam: Old Dogma and New Possibility, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1991, at
B6 (stating that United Kingdom's monitoring of 10,000 returnees indicates that Vietnam is
keeping its word not to persecute returnees); Sarah Helm, Diplomacy Has Failed Them, IN-
DEPENDENT, Aug. 14, 1991, at 19 (explaining that British Press interviewed returnees and
found "convincing evidence" that although they tended to suffer from poverty, returnees
were not persecuted by Vietnamese Government after their return); Dan Thomas, Boat People
Leaders Deny Deportees from Hong Kong Motivated by Greed, Reuter Libr. Rep., Oct. 22, 1991 avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (reporting that British Secretary for Security, Alistair
Asprey, stated that there has never been any evidence that any boat people who returned
voluntarily to Vietnam have been subjected to persecution or mistreatment).
226. Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 22 (noting that although for most part Vietnam has
kept its pledge not to persecute returnees, many returnees have experienced treatment of
type usually reserved for criminals); infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text (discussing
harassment and persecution of some voluntary returnees).
227. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 22 (indicating that as such harassment grows, so
does perception among returnees that their status has been root of problems in obtaining
jobs or licenses for business and fishing).
228. Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 22; see also id. (stating that returnees are further
treated like prisoners when authorities retain part of repatriation allowances given to them
upon return).
229. See Thomas, supra note 225 (providing example of one prototypical returnee who
always felt frightened because of frequent surveillance by security police); jee also supra note
212 and accompanying text (discussing denial of important documents).
230. Branigin, supra note 158, at A46 (reporting that Sidney Jones, executive director of
Asia Watch, stated that voluntary returnees "have experienced varying degrees of harassment
and interrogation, and we fear that those forced back will encounter worse").
231. See, e.g., Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 24 (noting that limited resources and re-
quirement that all contacts be made through government officials makes it very difficult to
monitor treatment of tens of thousands of returnees).
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ment officials. For example, when foreign observers interviewed
two returnees in one particular instance, a Vietnamese informant
disclosed that security police instructed the two boat people as to
how to respond. 232 In addition, local officials are typically present at
all interviews of repatriates by human rights monitoring person-
nel. 23 3 When Vietnamese officials arrange interviews with returnees
and "sit in" on such interviews, a coercive atmosphere is created
that is likely to inhibit full and frank disclosures of the conditions
returnees experience.
An additional problem hindering the monitoring of forced return-
ees is that UNHCR and other groups have limited resources to put
toward the monitoring process. 23 4 The forced repatriations con-
templated by Hong Kong and other countries of first asylum in
Southeast Asia involve tens of thousands of persons who would be
dispersed throughout Vietnam. 235 Such a situation, coupled with a
limited ability to freely access information from Vietnam, precludes
the careful monitoring necessary to ensure that returnees will be
free from persecution. Furthermore, persecution may take place on
a local level, despite guarantees by the central government that it
will not persecute returnees. 23 6
In summary, there is no reason to believe that Vietnam intends to
respect the human rights of asylum seekers residing in Hong Kong
if they are focibly returned to Vietnam. This is particularly true with
regard to individuals or members of subgroups of asylum seekers
that have openly criticized and opposed the Vietnamese Govern-
232. See Thomas, supra note 225 (explaining that because local officials were always pres-
ent at interviews checking for possible persecution, it is very difficult to obtain accurate ac-
counts of returnees' treatment).
233. Thomas, supra note 225.
234. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 24 (calling for involvement of other interna-
tional observers, including human rights advocates and representatives from voluntary agen-
cies, to assist in monitoring process that is currently understaffed and underfunded); see also
U.S. To Seek Assurances on New Boat People Programme, Reuter Libr. Rep., Sept. 24, 1990, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (reporting that U.S. State Department spokeswoman Mar-
garet Tutwiler said that United States "will seek assurances from the UNHCR... that the
existing system for UNHCR monitoring inside Vietnam is expanded to cover all returnees").
235. See Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 24 (arguing that because of large numbers of
returnees and enhanced risk of persecution, it is essential to involve international observers
and give them access to returnees in situations outside sphere of influence of Vietnamese
officials).
236. See MEMORA DUM, supra note 41, at 26 (arguing that local officials may be able to
operate autonomously to certain extent with regard to local populations); Despite Promises, Viet
Boat People Fear Harassment Back Home, Agence France Presse, Dec. 10, 1991, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Wires File (quoting Alistair Asprey, Hong Kong's Secretary for Security, as
stating that Vietnamese Government has guaranteed that no returnee to Vietnam will face
persecution and that monitoring by UNHCR will ensure that guarantee is fully respected, and
discussing forms of persecution at local level that are not likely to be detected through moni-
toring, as local authorities ignore directions from Hanoi and deal with returnees as they wish).
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ment while residing in Hong Kong. Until recently, the Vietnamese
Government refused to accept asylum seekers who were forcibly re-
patriated.2 37 Indeed, only when Vietnam wished to strengthen its
ties with the West did it display a reluctant willingness to accept asy-
lum seekers forcibly repatriated to Vietnam.238 This fact, coupled
with the inability of Hong Kong, the United Nations, and other or-
ganizations to effectively monitor the conditions endured by forced
returnees to Vietnam, demonstrates additional reasons why Hong
Kong should thoroughly consider sur place refugee claims.
IV. DIFFICULTIES INHERENT IN RECOGNITION
OF SUR PLACE REFUGEES
As a practical matter, there is great difficulty inherent in recogniz-
ing sur place refugee claims in the context of Vietnamese asylum
seekers. That is, a challenge lies in defining the scope of such a
refugee classification. Should the entire class of boat people benefit
from the classification, or should only those individuals or sub-
groups of asylum seekers who face a greater risk of persecution
benefit? Before June 15, 1988, the international community auto-
matically recognized all Vietnamese asylum seekers as refugees, and
nearly all were resettled in the West.239 The fact of automatic rec-
ognition and resettlement, however, created a magnet effect draw-
ing thousands of asylum seekers out of Vietnam. 240 Thus,
237. See Henry Kamm, Britain and Vietnam Still at Odds on Refugees, N.Y. TMES, June 15,
1989, at A19 (reporting that Vietnam's Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, invoked Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights to assert that Vietnam would only accept those persons who
volunteered to be repatriated).
238. See Vietnam Will Take Back Rejected Boat People, Cm. TRIB., Oct. 3, 1991, at C2 (stating
that Vietnam has reversed longstanding policy of rejecting forcibly returned boat people and
has expressed willingness to take them back); see also Barbara Basler, Vietnamese Resist Repatria-
tion Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1991, § 1, at 4 (discussing possibility that agreement may be
signed between Vietnam and United Kingdom to forcibly return screened-out asylum seekers
from Hong Kong to Vietnam). According to a British Foreign Office spokesperson in the
colony, "We have indicated we are ready to sign, and they have indicated they are not....
[W]e do not know for certain at this stage what is causing the delay." Id. But see Vietnamese
Foreign Minister Statement on Forced Repatriation, BBC, Nov. 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Wires File (quoting Foreign Minister of Vietnam as stating that "Vietnam never ac-
cepts forced repatriation of refugees and only welcomes voluntary repatriates on the basis of
respect for human rights in an orderly manner and in security"); Vietnamese Premier Vo Van Kiet
to Visit Malaysia, Kyodo News Serv.,Jan. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File
(reporting Vietnam's continued refusal to take back 13,000 asylum seekers in Malaysia).
239. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 41, at 5 (explaining that as of June 16, 1988, all
Vietnamese asylum seekers became subject to new screening process to determine refugee
status, rather than being automatically considered refugee as had happened in past).
240. See Siripora Buranaphan, Vietnam Blamedfor Boat People Exodus, Reuter Libr. Rep., May
28, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (quoting Joint Statement by ASEAN
states, Hong Kong, resettlement countries, and relief agencies indicating that "prospect of
automatic resettlement is a major 'pull factor' drawing people out of Vietnam"); Dinah Lee,
Hong Kongs Boat People in Limbo: Refugees Unable to Work or Leave, WASH. POST, May 26, 1985, at
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recognition of the entire class of asylum seekers as surplace refugees
would likely do more to exacerbate the flow of asylum seekers com-
ing to Hong Kong than contribute to a long-term solution to the
problem. With regard to asylum seekers whose claims are based on
circumstances occurring after their departure from Vietnam, Hong
Kong should recognize as sur place refugees individuals and mem-
bers of subgroups who have distinguished themselves through ex-
pression of their political opinions or membership in particular
subgroups in such a way that they face a significant risk of persecu-
tion if forcibly returned to Vietnam.241
Requiring that an individual or a member of a subgroup must face
a significant risk of persecution before surplace refugee status is rec-
ognized strikes a balance between several competing interests. For
example, Hong Kong has an interest in reducing the numbers of
asylum seekers occupying Hong Kong detention centers and in cur-
tailing the number of boat people seeking asylum in Hong Kong.
This interest is furthered because, under a significant risk require-
ment, a relatively small number of individuals or members of sub-
groups of asylum seekers would qualify for sur place refugee status.
Thus, Hong Kong is able to substantially continue its policy of re-
turning screened-out asylum seekers to Vietnam as well as deterring
future asylum seekers from coming to Hong Kong. Similarly, the
international community has an interest in ensuring that the princi-
ple of non-refoulement is respected. This goal is furthered because
asylum seekers who would face a significant risk of persecution if
returned to Vietnam will be recognized as surplace refugees and thus
spared refoulement to Vietnam. Finally, asylum seekers' interest in
having their asylum claims considered with the full benefit of princi-
ples articulated in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol is signifi-
cantly furthered because Hong Kong will thoroughly consider
claims for sur place refugee status based on circumstances that arose
after departure from Vietnam. Fully considering the sur place refu-
gee claims of individuals and members of subgroups in this manner
would represent a significant step in complying with international
refugee law, preserving the principle of non-refoulement, and further-
ing Hong Kong's domestic interests.
Critics may argue that recognizing sur place refugees in this way
A34 (noting "growing suspicion" in West that resettlement program is enticing people to
leave Vietnam in hopes of finding more stable and peaceful place to live).
241. See Linda D. Bevis, Comment, "Political Opinions" of Refugees: Interpreting International
Sources, 63 WAsH. L. REv. 395, 411 (1988) (asserting that in determining sur place refugee
status, it is important to inquire whether political opinions of asylum seeker have been noticed
by potential persecutors).
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will encourage asylum seekers to express political opinions and be-
come members of certain subgroups for the purpose of being recog-
nized as refugees. An asylum seeker's motive for expressing a
political opinion should be given little if any weight, however.
Under the 1951 Convention, as interpreted by the U.N. Handbook,
the motivation behind an asylum seeker's expression of a political
opinion is not relevant. 242 Paragraphs eighty, eighty-two, and
eighty-three of the U.N. Handbook describe "political opinion" but
make no mention of inquiring into the motivation behind expres-
sions of such opinions. 245 By contrast, paragraph eighty-six, which
defines the circumstances in which a person committing a criminal
act qualifies as a political refugee, specifically states that the motiva-
tion behind the criminal act is a relevant factor to be considered in
determining refugee status.2 44 Such an omission indicates that,
under the U.N. Handbook, the motivation behind an expression of a
political opinion should not be considered in deciding whether to
recognize sur place refugee status, much less be given determinative
weight. Rather, the inquiry should remain focused on whether the
asylum seeker faces a significant risk of persecution if forcibly re-
turned to Vietnam because of circumstances that arose during the
applicant's absence from Vietnam.
V. RECOMMENDATION THAT THE UNITED NATIONS EXERCISE
MANDATE POWER To SAFEGUARD THE PRINCIPLE OF NoN-
REFOULEMENT UNTIL SCREENING PROCESS
ADEQUATELY CONSIDERS SUR PL4CE
REFUGEE CLAIMS
Until Hong Kong adopts a policy of fully considering sur place ref-
ugee claims, the United Nations should exercise its mandate
power 245 to recognize those individuals and members of subgroups
within the Hong Kong Vietnamese community who are particularly
vulnerable to political persecution because of circumstances arising
after their departure from Vietnam. If people meet the require-
ments of sur place refugee status under the UNHCR statute, they
should qualify for the protection of the United Nations. This is true
whether or not they are so recognized by their host country.
246
242. See id. at 411 (explaining that motive is only relevant to determine if there is persecu-
tion in prosecution for crime).
243. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, paras. 80, 82-83.
244. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, para. 86.
245. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, paras. 13-19 (setting forth guidelines for United
Nations use of mandate power to grant refugee status).
246. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 8, paras. 13-19.
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Traditionally, the use of the United Nations mandate power to
confer refugee status has been limited to persons of concern to the
international community. 247 As of December 1991, the United Na-
tions has extended refugee status under its mandate power to 851
Vietnamese asylum seekers.248 This process of ad hoc review and
recognition of refugee status by the United Nations developed as a
result of the efforts of the Agency for Volunteer Service (AVS), 249
which believed that numerous cases fell within the 1951 Convention
definition of "refugee" but were not successful in obtaining refugee
status before the Refugee Status Review Boards. 250 As a result, AVS
and UNHCR officials agreed on a system in which AVS acts as an
advocate for cases it feels have been resolved incorrectly by the Re-
view Boards.25' If the UNHCR official can be convinced that an in-
dividual meets the definition of a refugee under the 1951
Convention, then the UNHCR official has the authority to "mandate
in" such cases and extend refugee status to that individual.252
Under an agreement with Hong Kong, such "mandate" refugees are
eligible for resettlement and are protected against forced repatria-
tion to Vietnam.2 53 Additionally, the Government of Hong Kong
has indicated that it is prepared to accept any number of refugees
identified by the UNHCR under its mandate.2 54 Thus, the United
Nations should increase the use of its mandate power to recognize
particularly vulnerable individuals and subgroups who qualify as sur
place refugees until sur place refugee status is fully considered by
Hong Kong officials.
247. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 9, at 6 (noting, however, that over past 30 years, this
concept has been broadened considerably).
248. See Dan Thomas, Lawyers Attack Hong Kong's System for Screening Asylum Seekers, Reuter
Libr. Rep., Dec. 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (stating that 851 is
number of asylum seekers recognized as refugees by United Nations under its mandate
power, out of total of approximately 19,000 asylum seekers screened out by Hong Kong
officials).
249. See id (explaining that Agency for Volunteer Service (AVS) includes group of appeals
counsellors funded by UNHCR who advise and represent asylum seekers appealing negative
screening decisions).
250. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 41, at 9 (discussing international Refugee Status Re-
view Boards set up to review decisions made by immigration officers regarding asylum seekers
screened out during first stage of refugee determination processes); see also id. at 13 (stating
that majority of cases AVS has taken before Refugee Status Review Boards, representing
about 10%o of 180 cases appealed to Review Boards each week, have been unsuccessful even
though many fall clearly within Convention's definition of refugee).
251. See MEMORANDUM, supra note 41, at 13 (characterizing AVS practice as "second look"
at strongest cases that failed to be successful in screening process).
252. MEMORANDUM, supra note 41, at 13.
253. MEMORANDUM, supra note 41, at 13.
254. Indefinite Detention, supra note 7, at 9.
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CONCLUSION
Screening officials in Hong Kong apply an excessively narrow def-
inition of "refugee" in the case of individuals and subgroups of
Vietnamese asylum seekers because they fail to consider surplace ref-
ugee claims adequately.2 55 The result is an unwarranted denial of
refugee status to many of the Vietnamese asylum seekers screened
out as economic migrants.2 5 6 Hong Kong has laid the groundwork
for the forcible repatriation of thousands of Vietnamese citizens to
Vietnam. 257 Many of those to be forcibly repatriated, including in-
dividuals and members of certain subgroups, are likely to experi-
ence persecution and violation of their human rights upon return to
Vietnam. 258 These circumstances highlight the inadequacy of Hong
Kong's present application of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Proto-
col and consequent failure to safeguard the customary norm ofnon-
refoulement.259
The present framework of asylum law, embodied in the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol and interpreted by the U.N.
Handbook, requires the examination and recognition of surplace refu-
gee claims.260 Unfortunately, Hong Kong's refusal to apply such in-
ternationally recognized principles in screening asylum seekers
creates a dangerous situation for numerous individuals and mem-
bers of subgroups poised to be forcibly returned to Vietnam. The
United Nations, under its mandate power, has the power to inter-
vene and classify many of these asylum seekers as refugees sur
place.26 1 Consequently, the United Nations should expand the
number of asylum seekers so recognized in order to safeguard par-
ticularly vulnerable individuals and subgroups from refoulement to a
Vietnam in which they face a significant risk of persecution.2 62
255. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing criteria used by Hong Kong
officials to determine asylum seekers' refugee status).
256. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing economic migrants as persons
not protected under 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol).
257. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text (discussing Hong Kong's planned
forced repatriation of majority of boat people still in colony).
258. See supra notes 204-12 and accompanying text (discussing mistreatment of refugees
that is likely to occur upon their return to Vietnam).
259. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing inadequacy of Hong Kong's
present screening process and arguing that even if process accomplishes stated goal of sepa-
rating economic immigrants from political refugees, procedure will not fully uphold principle
of non-refoulement).
260. See supra note 245 and accompanying text (explaining U.N. mandate power to grant
sur place refugees asylum).
261. See supra notes 245-54 and accompanying text (discussing mandate power of UNHCR
under 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol).
262. See supra notes 204-12 and accompanying text (discussing persecution of forced re-
turnees and difficulty of monitoring returnees to ensure their safety).
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While thoroughly considering surplace refugee claims may impose
some hardship on countries of first asylum and present difficulties in
the application of surplace criteria, it is a price that must be borne by
the international community in the interest of protecting the human
rights of Vietnamese asylum seekers in Hong Kong. Until condi-
tions in Vietnam are such that individuals expressing contrary polit-
ical opinions or who are members of particular social groups will
not be placed at serious risk of persecution, the international com-
munity must respect the rights of Vietnamese citizens to seek asylum
in other countries and ensure that claims of sur place refugee status
are fully considered.

